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Abstract
A n enhancement to T C P (Transmission Control Protocol) is proposed to give additional security
between cooperating client/server programs.
Several modes of operation are available including: program controlled mode where new ioctl
commands are used to provide explicit control over the actions taken by the kernel in the
provision of security services, client or server controlled mode where one of the client/server
pair initiates and controls security features without the knowledge or intervention of the other
party and finally kernel controlled mode where two kernels will establish and maintain secure
communication without intervention of either client or server program.
To achieve client or server controlled and kernel controlled operation, three new T C P option
fields have been defined to allow the passage of security setup information at session
establishment time. The threeway handshake session setup of T C P is used as a vehicle to
piggyback information used to establish the type of encryption scheme in use as well as
encrypted session keys.
Flexibility in the type of encryption schemes used is permitted with open access to the methods
of defining new schemes to be used and mapping of these schemes to new scheme numbers
within the T C P option fields. Schemes implemented as part of this work include an optimised
version of DBS (Data Encryption Standard) in both codebook and feedback mode, Triple DES
in both codebook and feedback modes, L O K I is used in codebook mode and a new stream
oriented cipher called Sapphire is used to compare purpose built stream ciphers with more
traditional block methods.
The implementation of the protocol is described as it applies to the Linux operating system
kernel structures, program code and the new formats for TCP. Some performance issues are
then canvassed as they apply to the various schemes employed. The performance measures
apply to client/server programs exchanging data either on a single host or between adjacent
hosts on an otherwise unloaded ethernet network. When other than trivial encryption schemes
are employed the cost of encryption becomes dominant and network bandwidth restriction are
not an issue.
The procedures required to add a new encryption scheme using the formats and entry points of a
canonical scheme is then described. Using this description it is possible to implement any new
scheme that can be expressed in this canonical format.
Possible suggestions for enhancements to overcome potential bottlenecks are then discussed and
a conclusion is given.
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1. Introduction

With the advent of allpervasive global network technology the requirement for improved
security over existing networks will increase. Authorities are adopting principles of privacy
and confidentiality over information held by others. Increasingly the onus of responsibility
for demonstrating the appropriate need for, handling of, and disposal of such information is
falling on the holders of such information.
The handling of information includes (but is not limited to) gathering and dissemination
electronically It is possible that the gathering and dissemination of such information may
require transmission over various types of networks. In general, if no special action is taken,
information is transmitted and received in a format that can be readily interpreted by a
determined third party. Consider the situation where a sensitive database is contained on a
host in a format that is encrypted on disk. In a static sense the data is protected against
unauthorised disclosure but in a dynamic sense when remote access is required, the DBMS
system would, for example, decrypt data on the DBMS host and present it to users in a
format that could be handled by existing network and application protocols such as TCP,
telnet and rlogin. The transmission of such data over shared network facilities may pose an
unacceptable risk of disclosure, particularly if such facilities are shared between
organisations with different statutory requirements and cultures. The need to provide an
end-to-end secure service has been discussed by Brown [12] and loannidis [18] and is
discussed below.
This work takes a similar approach at a different level and will enhance an existing transport
protocol to enable users to pass data between applications with an increased level of security
and hence address some of the possible concerns of disclosure and unauthorised access
discussed above. As a starting point for the work, it is assumed that we have access to a
notionally secure application and host operating system environment. Should either of these
be compromised then any level of network security will be to little avail.

Several concepts have been introduced and will now be expanded on. These include the
notion of security and the principíeles of encryption that can be used to enhance security.
Next, concepts concerning networking are discussed together with a more indepth
consideration of the Transmission Control Protocol. Previous work in the general area of
network security is then discussed along with some of the pros and cons of such approaches.
Any networking software requires an underlying operating system and hardware to run on.
In this instance the Linux operating system was chosen running on a typical Intel® 80486 PC.
A general description of Linux is provided together with a brief tour of how a simple
network application would proceed during execution in the kernel. A description of the
enhanced functionality proposed is then presented along with descriptions of the
architectural and implementation changes that are required to make it possible. Some
performance measures are provided to estimate the cost of such enhancements. A conclusion
is provided together with some possible future extensions.

2. Security and Encryption
Security is linked with the idea of protection. An entity is considered valuable if it is worth
spending effort protecting it. The act of protection is security. Security comes in many forms.
Physical security is concerned with protection of real assets and can include such things as
restricting access with fences, locked rooms, guards, sealed channels, fire suppression,
tamper proof terminals etc. Logical security is concerned with the protection of information
and is used to complement the protection provided by physical security. The science of
logical security as it applies to data is known as cryptography.
Cryptography can provide a number of functions. These include the ability to hide
information in messages providing privacy and the ability to identify the source of messages
providing authentication. The fundamental tool used in cryptography is encryption.
Encryption provides a method of transforming a message in such a way that it is readable by
authorised receivers and unreadable by anyone else. The basic property of the encryption
transformation is that it is not easily invertible without access to a parameter known as the
enciphering key. From [34] we have a formal definition of a cryptosystem (an
implementation of an encryption transformation) as a single parameter family of invertible
functions,
EK;KgK
where K is the keyspace, which is of finite length. If M is the message space and C is the
cryptogram space, the we must have the following properties:
• An enciphering algorithm

for any fixed encryption key KgK is an invertible transformation of the message space
into the cryptogram space,
• There is an inverse algorithm E^ = DK called the decryption algorithm.
DK:C->M
Such that DK(C) = DK[EK(M)] = M ;

• The keys should uniquely define the enciphered message,

Whereas cryptography is concerned with designing and implementing secure encryption
algorithms, cryptanalysis is concerned with the recovery of messages without recourse to the
cipherkey. The cryptanalyst may have multiple motives including the ability to read
ciphered messages, modify messages without authority, pose as a legitimate user, replay
messages or transactions or deny service. The main thrust of this paper is to thwart attempts
to read messages without authority, however certain other aims mentioned above may also
be less effective as a result of these enhancements.
2.1. Symmetric Encryption
Symmetric encryption is a scheme where two parties share a common cipherkey K and a
known encryption and decryption scheme. The encryptor forms a cryptogram by passing a
message M through the encryption scheme using the cipherkey K producing ciphertext C.
The ciphertext is then transmitted to the receiver who applies the decryption scheme using
the same cipherkey. This reveals the original message.

M

• Encryption
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Decryption

M

K

Fig #1 - Symmetric Encryption

2.1.1. DES
The Data Encryption Standard (DES) ANSI-X3.92-1981 provides an implementation of a
symmetric encryption scheme. It uses a sixteen round system of permutations and

substitutions with a 56 bit key and 64 bit blocks of data. The permutations are provided by
bit selection tables for bitwise reordering. The substitution function is provided by the so
called S-boxes which take 6 bit input values that have previously been expanded from 4 bits
and produces 4 bit output values. Each round uses the permutation and substitution
function along with a permuted key choice based on the original key.
ANSI-X3.106-1983 Data Encryption Standard - Modes of Operation, provides two methods
of using DES. In Electronic Codebook Mode (ECB) input is blocked in 64 bit blocks and each
block is encrypted using the same 56 bit cipherkey to produce 64 bit output blocks.

Clear
Text

64 bits
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•

DES

64 bits

Ciphertext

Key
Fig #2 - DES ECB Mode

In Cipher Block Chaining mode (CBC) the results of previous encryptions are fed back to the
current input. As in ECB input data is blocked into 64 bit blocks. The first block is combined
with an initial vector and encrypted to give the first cryptogram. The cryptogram is
forwarded to the receiver and also replaces the initial vector. The second block is now
combined with the initial vector and encrypted giving the second cryptogram and replacing
the initial vector and so on.
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Fig #3 - DES CBC Mode

There has been considerable controversy over the perceived secrecy in the early
development of DES [38]. There was concern that the details of the design principals of the
S-boxes were kept secret and that the 56 bit key was too short. To overcome this second
problem it is possible to use DES in what has become known as Triple-DES. In this mode two
56 bit keys and three phases of encryption are used. The first phase encrypts with the first
key. The second phase deaypts with the second key. The third phase again encrypts with the
first key. This mode of operation provides enhanced security compared to ordinary DES.

Cleartext

64 bits

DES

DES"^
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1

Fig #4 - Triple-DES

Other examples of symmetric algorithms include LOKI, FEAL and IDEA.

2.2. Asymmetric Encryption
Symmetric encryption assumes that the legitimate senders and receivers of a message have
access to the secret key required for enciphering and deciphering. It is possible to arrange
for an encryption scheme to be designed such that the key has two parts, one of these parts is
public and globally known, the other part is private and known only to the receiver. A
ciphertext message is constructed by encrypting with the public key and retrieved by
decrypting with the private key. Such schemes are known as asymmetric encryption
schemes.

Cleartext

Encrypt

Ciphertext

Decrypt

k
P

Private Key

Public Key

Key
Generator

Fig #5 - Asymmetric Encryption

Typically, asymmetric schemes use combinations of numeric problems thought to be
intractable (such as factorisation and discrete logarithm] to implement the encrypting and
decrypting functions. An example of an asymmetric scheme is RSA which uses the fact that
it can reveal enough information to compute certain functions over discrete rings but
maintain the necessary factors to decode the ciphertext in secret.
The major disadvantage of asymmetric schemes designed to date is that to provide the
required level of intractability the basic encryption and decryption processes tend to be
computationally expensive compared to symmetric algorithms such as DES, For this reason
asymmetric schemes tend to be used to distribute keys to be subsequently used by
symmetric schemes.

2.3. Block Cipher vs Stream Cipher
The encryption schemes discussed so far have assumed that input data can be easily blocked
in 64 bit blocks. This method of operation can be inconvenient in a networked environment
where data may be transmitted on a byte (or even bit) oriented boundary. Adapting a block
cipher scheme to a stream cipher scheme is relatively simple and involves using the block
oriented cipher to provide a pseudo-random bit sequence that can be XOR'ed with any
output stream to provide an encrypted stream.

bits
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Ciphertext

Fig #6 - Stream Cipher

Alternatively, special purpose byte (or bit) oriented stream ciphers have been designed that
operate without the requirement to use a pseudo random number generator as a source of
bits. Examples of such ciphers include RC4, a proprietary system from RSA Data Security
Inc. and the Sapphire Stream Cipher by Johnson [22]. The Sapphire Stream Cipher can be
conceptually compared to a game of cards. The deck has 256 cards with face values ranging
from 0 to 255. The initial deck is shuffled with values based on the user's key which can be
up to 255 bytes long. In operation, five cards are drawn from the deck. The draw is based on
three index variables (rotor , ratchet, avalanche) and the previous value of input, both plain
and encrypted. These five cards are rotated in the deck and the three index values updated.
Two of these updates (ratchet and avalanche) are based on values drawn and the third
(rotor) is simply an increment. Now five cards are drawn based on the new values of the

index variables and the existing values of the last input, both plain and enaypted. The face
values of the five drawn cards are added modulus 256 and used to select another card whose
face value is used as an index into the deck once again. This final draw provides a suitable
byte to XOR with the input stream. Decryption is identical to encryption with the exception
that the resulting XOR on the enciphered text produces the original plain text.
The robustness of the Sapphire Stream Cipher is yet to be demonstrated. (Various follow
ups to [22].)

3. Networking

The basic function of a network is to provide connectivity between two processes that wish
to communicate. These processes may ultimately be human or machine and it is possible
that there may be more than two processes. The International Standards Organisation (ISO)
has provided a model known as the Open Systems Interconnect (OSI) that allows a layered
approach to network connectivity to be developed.
3.1. The ISO Reference Model of Open Systems Interconnection (OSI)

This seven layered model has been established by the International Standards Organisation
(ISO) according to several principals. These include:
• Each layer creates a new level of abstraction.
• Each layer performs a well defined function (or functions).
• Each layer should be able to define International Protocol Standards at its boimdary.
• Information flow between layers should be minimal.

ISO Reference Model
Application Layer

Application Layer

Presentation Layer

Presentation Layer

Session Layer

Session Layer

Transport Layer

Transport Layer

Network Layer

Network Layer

Data Link Layer

Data Link Layer

Physical Layer

Physical Layer
Fig #7

3.1.1. The Layers of OSI
The seven layers in the OSI Model are:
• The Physical Layer
• The Data Link Layer
• The Network Layer
• The Transport Layer
• The Session Layer
• The Presentation Layer
• The Application Layer
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Generally they are shown as a stack of protocol blocks with the Application Layer at the top
and the Physical Layer at the bottom.
Each layer is briefly described below:
3.1.1.1. The Physical Layer
The primary concern of the physical layer is the format and transmission of bits of data.
Various methods of transmitting bits can be used, as can various media. Issues addressed
within this layer include mechanical, procedural and electrical interfacing as well as capacity
and timing. The X.21 standard, which was approved in 1976, is an example of a Physical
layer protocol which specifies how a DTE (Data Terminal Equipment) sets up and clears
down calls with a DCE (Date Circuit-Terminating Equipment).
3.LL2. The Data Link Layer
This layer is concerned with providing a reliable and efficient method of communicating a
set of bits, typically known as a frame, between two adjacent pieces of network hardware. In
this context adjacent means that both pieces of hardware are joined by a conceptual "wire"
and that bits entering one end of the "wire" will appear in the same order at the other end.
The "wire" can be physical cable (metal or fibre optic), infrared, laser, satellite channel, etc as
long as it appears "wire like".
While it appears that sending and receiving frames along a piece of wire is simple, protocols
at this level must deal with errors such as: line noise (which scrambles bits within a frame or
loses entire fr^es), the limited reception capacity of a receiving piece of network hardware
(which can cause frames to be dropped or otherwise ignored), the underlying capacity of the
"wire" and the possibility that frames may be duplicated by error (say, echo on a line) or
design (a transmitter thought a frame was lost when it wasn't and resent it). Protocols which
achieve the above goals are candidates for Data Link Protocols. Some examples include
HDLC (High Level Data Link Control) and its subset LAPB (Balanced Link Access
Procedure) which is often used with X.21 in achieving point to point or multipoint wide area

connection. The standards of the IEEE 802 Committee deal with Data Link Protocols for local
area networks including Ethernet and Token Ring.
3.1.1.3. The Network Layer

The function of the Network Layer is to deliver, via one or more "hops" along Data Link
Layers, a set of data bits known typically as a Packet or Datagram from a source "Host" to a
destination "Host".
On receiving a data packet from the next highest level in the protocol stack (the Transport
Layer) the network layer will choose the appropriate Data Link Layer interface and form a
frame consisting of the data associated with the packet, the packet header (network
addressing information that will not change as a result of hopping) and the Data Link header
(interface addressing information for the current hop). This frame is then passed to the data
Link Layer for transmission across the physical media. This process is continued on a hop by
hop basis until the destination is reached at which time the packet is handed to the next
highest layer of the protocol for processing.
The Network Layer is responsible for routing between source and destination hosts. It is also
typically responsible for congestion control.
In the area of switched packet networks X.25 represents an International Standard for the
implementation of a Network Protocol. Within the TCP/IP Internet suite IP (Internet
Protocol) can loosely be considered a Network Layer protocol.
3.1.1.4. The TVansport Layer

The Transport Layer provides a reliable and efficient end to end message service. Whereas
the Network Layer is concerned with the concept of a packet, whose characteristics are
defined by underlying layers, the Transport Layer deals with messages which may be of
arbitrary length and are defined by higher levels of the protocol. This requires the Transport
Layer to provide multiplexing, fragmentation, de-fragmentation and buffering functions.
While the Network Layer attempts to provide consistent delivery it can not guarantee such

services. The Transport Layer must therefore provide a service without error, loss,
rearrangement or duplication of messages.
An International Standard for the Transport Layer is provided by X.75. In the TCP/IP
Internet suite UDP can be loosely considered a Transport Protocol but lacks some of the
reliability features described above. TCP includes such facilities as well as many others that
could well be considered Session Layer features.
3.LL5, The Session Layer
The Session Layer builds on services provided by the Transport Layer. In particular the
provision of user addressing. In general the Transport level provides host-to-host message
delivery and the session layer provides user-to-user delivery by adding user identification to
message headers thus allowing the receiving host to determine which user owns an
incoming message. The Session Layer may also provide crash recovery, synchronisation,
checkpointing facilities, transport layer congestion control or dynamic reconfiguration
control over multiple transport paths.
Within the TCP/IP Internet suite TCP provides much of the Session Level functionality
described above.
3.LL6. The Presentation Layer
The Presentation Layer can be used to provide a range of add-in functions that are not
readily adaptable at lower levels of the protocol stack. These services are, by their nature,
added as needed, usually through shared libraries or additional operating system services.
Traditionally, Encryption and Privacy measures are seen as belonging to the Presentation
Level since it is desirable to encipher messages as close to their origin as possible.
Other services that can be provided at the Presentation Level include data compression,
Virtual Terminal functionality. Virtual File Systems and character set translation.
In the Unix environment Virtual Terminal Protocols include such things as Telnet and Xll,
while Virtual File Systems are provided by NFS and ftp. Many systems offer "3270 type"

emulation packages that provide character translation function between ASCII and EBCDIC
character sets.
3.1.1.7. The Application Layer
The Application Level can be used to provide services that have a specific functional
requirements. This compares with the Presentation Level which provides general tools
within the "Distributed Operating System" theme.
Services may build on those provided by the Presentation Level and may include things
such as distributed database management and its associated transaction processing facility,
mail services and protocols, directory services and protocols, time services, authentication
services, hierarchical storage management, news services and hypertext services.
The Unix environment mail services are provides by SMTP [15] (among others), time
services by NTP [10], authentication services by Kerberos [36] , news services by NNTP [15].
In the International Standards area mail protocols include X.400 with directory services
provided by X.500.
3.1.2. Deliveiy of Data through the Protocol Stack
Typically each layer places a header on data that it receives from the next highest layer.
When it reaches its final destination headers are removed one layer at a time and the final
data is delivered to its "end-user". This is illustrated in the following diagram.
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PH - Presentation Header, SH - Session Header, TH - Transport Header, NH - Network
Header, DH - Data Link Header, FH - Physical Header, ECC - Error Correcting Code, FCC Frame Check Code.
Fig #7 - Layer Headers

3.2. Security Issues

Each layer of the protocol stack faces its own set of problems and solutions in the area of
network security Some of these issues will be addressed in the following paragraphs with
reference to examples of specific implementations at each level. (This is not meant to be an
exhaustive coverage but rather an introduction).
3.2. L Physical Layer Security Issues

The issues of concern at the Physical Layer of the protocol stack are in many ways similar to
the physical security issues faced by system implementors of all computer systems. To be

FCC

secure from an attack that either collects intelligence or denies access, any system (computer
or otherwise) must employ techniques of defence well known outside the computing
industry. These include such things as: physically restricted areas, all round security in
depth, segregated personnel responsibility, physical monitoring etc. In a network
environment however, some of these techniques are difficult to implement and must be
considered in the context of the geographically dispersed nature of the network. Two
techniques that relate to the physical security of networks are presented below as examples.

3.2.1.1. TEMPEST
The acronym TEMPEST has two meanings. Firstly the offensive meaning used by
intelligence gatherers, Transient Electromagnetic Pulse Surveillance Technology, which
works by monitoring emissions of electromagnetic radiation (EMR) from devices and
reconstructing useful information from these emanations. Secondly TEMPEST has a
defensive meaning, Transient Electromagnetic Pulse Emanation Standard, which are
techniques used to hide, distort or baffle EMR so that offensive TEMPEST techniques will
fail.
All electromagnetic devices emit electromagnetic radiation. Some of this radiation is used to
transmit infonnation but much is simply radiated off into space and this can be intercepted
and reconstructed into coherent form. For example, VDUs typically work by using an
electron gun to scan across a screen many times per second refreshing pixels which then
glow for a short time before the next scan. The firing of the electron gun causes emissions of
EMR which can be detected and intercepted, with the intelligence gatherer simply
synchronising their own electron gun with the targets', thus replicating the image of the
target screen on their own screen. Since all devices have characteristic signatures it is
possible to "tune in" to a particular device at a distance of up to one kilometer.
Although more difficult, the same techniques can by used for memory devices and I/O
channels (at much shorter distances than VDUs] to reconstruct memory images and I/O
traffic on target systems.

In its defensive mode TEMPEST attempts to mask EMR emissions so that offensive
TEMPEST techniques will fail. These techniques can be applied at a number of levels.
Devices themselves can be baffled to reduce the level of EMR they radiate and hence reduce
the range at which offensive TEMPEST is effective. At the next level, rooms, buildings or
entire installations can be baffled so that non TEMPEST rated devices can not emanate EMR
beyond secured boundaries. This could be effective in the case of a local area network where
individual shielding would be impractical.
While TEMPEST provides a significant level of physical security it is very expensive to
implement and maintain and generally is only available to military and intelligence
community users.
3.2.1.2. Phreaking
Just as government and company based networks need security, carrier based networks
(télécoms) also need network security. This has been demonstrated by the emergence of a
technique known as phreaking.
Phreaking works by exploiting known (and sometimes undocumented) signaling and
diagnostic features of modem telephone exchanges to gain unauthorised access to carrier
services. Generally an acceptable level of human speech can be carried between the 700 and
900 Hz range, by using frequencies well beyond these limits the national carriers can place
routing, diagnostic and signaling information on the same physical circuits, thus avoiding
duplication of infrastructure (data and control) on long distance networks. With a
knowledge of such standards as the CCITT Signaling System 7 and the CCITT C5 C6 C7
which deal with the way PABXs and Local Exchanges communicate plus access to some
relatively cheap hardware for generating the required frequency tones, it has been
demonstrated that unauthorised access within a variety of countries is possible. This
uncontrolled access to national carrier facilities represents a potential security threat as well
as a loss in revenue.

3.2.2. Data Link Layer Security Issues
Security at the Datalink Layer is generally restricted to encrypting the contents of frames
since this layer is only concerned with a single hop on the network. This approach is
acceptable when data is being transmitted over a point to point service such as a LAPB link
when both sides know who the other side is and key distribution does not present a large
administrative or technical overhead. In the case of local area networks however the problem
of key distribution and proliferation among a potentially large number of network machines
becomes a problem.
Another shortfall with encrypting at this layer is that all intermediate network layers must
have access to the frame encryption key to allow routing information to be extracted. This
potentially compromises the user information in the frame.
3.2.2. L End to End Encryption
In the point to point case, security of a network can be enhanced by the placement of an
encryption device as part of the sending and receiving modems or NTUs. Several
commercial types of such devices exist and are readily available.
3.2.3. Network Layer Security Issues
As with the Datalink Layer, Network Layer security tends to involve encrypting network
packets. In this case however host to host encryption can be established as network header
information can be left in cleartext to allow the passage of a packet through the network.
Within the TCP/IP Internet suite, the IP protocol includes provision for security extensions
but lacks some of the key management and source authentication details required. A
proposed protocol known as swIPe [19] addresses these issues and provides a mechanism to
secure networks at this layer.
These are several disadvantages in using a mechanism that encrypts data packets. Since
encryption occurs at a relatively low level of the protocol stack the user is faced with the
situation where higher layers of the stack must process user data "in clear" prior to reaching

the Network Layer. Given that most implementations of higher level protocols (e.g. TCP and
UDP) have facilities to trace and monitor data going through their respective layers the user
must place considerable trust in the implementation of these layers as well as users that may
have access to them (either as administrators or otherwise).
Generally Network Layer services (e.g. IP and X.25) provide a connectionless service
between two hosts. This implies that packets may be lost, duplicated and/or arrive out of
order. These problems must be sorted out by higher layers of the protocol. When encryption
is used care must be taken that all encryption activity on individual packets is independent
of any other packet.

3.2.3.L swIPe
The swIPe protocol provides an extension to the TCP/IP Internet suite with three additional
security services.
• Data confidentiality: Protection against unauthorised access to data being transmitted.
• Data integrity: Protection against alteration or replaying of traffic.
• Source Authentication: Network addresses are authenticated as part of the protocol.
SwIPe consists of three conceptual areas:
• A Policy engine which determines the action to be taken on outgoing packets, whether to
accept incoming packets and how to process accepted incoming packets.
• A Key management engine which handles the production and distribution of keys.
Master keys are dealt with on a manual basis.
• The Security engine which does the actual work of encryption, authentication, integrity
and confidentiality checking under the direction of the Policy engine.
SwIPe packets are enclosed within IP packets using the IPIP extension to IP (IPIP - IP inside
IP Protocol). The contents of the packets are encrypted using DES with MD5 used for
authentication.

In operation, a packet to be transmitted is passed to swIPe where the policy engine decides
whether authentication and/or encryption is required. If so, then the key management
engine

provides

appropriate

keys

and

the

security

engine

does

the

required

encryption/authentication passing the packet on to IP for transmission to the required host.
On reception the receiving host takes roughly the opposite path to deliver clear data to the
user.
Since IP does not provide a reliable delivery service the keys used to transmit packets
belonging to the same session must be fixed. This eliminates the possibility of using any
form of feedback stream cipher in the operation of this protocol. Similarly all packets must
be padded to the minimum block size for encryption thus wasting potential bandwidth.
3.2.4. IVansport Layer Security Issues
The Transport Layer provides a convenient place to segregate an organisations network from
the outside world or other networks within the organisation. The boundaries of these
networks are equipped with gateways to provide services such as protocol and media
conversion, interfacing to telecommunication carriers and network security. When a gateway
is used at a network boundary to provide security features it is often called a firewall.
As with the Network Layer it is possible to provide an end to end encryption facility
between two "networks" over a hostile internet. In contrast to the Network Layer the
Transport Layer provides a reliable message passing service thus allowing the use of more
sophisticated feedback stream ciphers instead of the fixed key type arrangement used by
swIPe.
3.2.4. L Firewalls
The objective of a firewall is to prevent unauthorised access to the "insides" of a protected
network by a variety of means. Within TCP/IP networks it is possible to establish gateways
that discriminate on network traffic based on source and/or destination IP addresses thus
only allowing known hosts to connect into or out off the protected area of the network. It is

also possible to limit access to certain TCP ports, thus only allowing certain services that use
well known addresses such as telnet or ftp, etc to function through certain hosts. These
restrictions can include running certain services such as mail, domain name server and time
servers on only trusted hosts within the network and thus funneling all such functions to
and from them in a controlled fashion.
Monitoring functions can be performed on such firewalls by including well known
"wrapper" software which intercepts and records requests of a suspicious nature.
3.2.5. Session Layer Security Issues
At the Session Layer it is possible, for the first time in the protocol stack, to differentiate
between individual users in a meaningful way. To this point, only system generated or
stored keys have been used for encryption purposes. It is now possible and convenient to
obtain keys directly from users on a use by use basis. This allows for the implementation of
features which include such things as one time use scratch keys and challenge response
mode protocols.
Some of these concepts have been implemented in secured versions of telnet and ftp.
3.2.5.1. Secure telnet/ftp
Although telnet and ftp protocols have been described as belonging to the Presentation
Level services, the extensions proposed by Brown [12,13,14] can loosely be considered
"Session Level" since they occur below Presentation services such as file transfer and screen
interpretation.
In the proposed protocol, telnet and ftp sessions can include a challenge response sequence
that allows a host to authenticate a potential user from a remote and unsecured network by
passing a 64bit random number to the user and verifying that the response is appropriate.
The reverse can also be achieved. Having authenticated that the user/host is who they said
they were the pair can now exchange data using either the DES or LOKI encryption schemes.
These facilities can be turned on or off at any time.

3.2.6. Presentation Layer Security Issues
Little implementation or standardisation effort has been placed into the general area of
Presentation Level services with most services being provided on a ad-hoc basis. One
attempt to provide such services in the area of security comes from AT&T which has
developed a grab bag of library routines to assist in the provision of general purpose
encryption tools.
3.2.6. L CryptoLib
CryptoLib [26] provides a collection of routines that can be used as addin services when
developing secure network protocols. The library is written in C and provides a portable and
efficient method of supporting public and private key systems. The advantage of having
such a library at this level of the protocol stack (as opposed to the Application Layer) is that
each application does not have to rebuild the functionality provided by the library. Facilities
provided include:
• Big integer creation and manipulation tools
• Big Arithmetic functions: addition subtraction, division, multiplication and shifting.
• Modular exponentiation and multiplication and the modulo operation.
• Bitwise AND,OR and XOR
• Chinese Remainder Theorem speedup of exponentiation
• Quadratic residue test, square root (mod prime), square root (mod composite of two
primes)
• Random number generators - pseudo and true
• Prime number generators and Primality test
• Euclid's Extended Greatest Common Divisor algorithm
• DES encryption and decryption
• RSA methods
• El Gamal methods

• NIST key generation and DSA
• NIST Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
3.2.7. Application Layer Security Issues
At the application level, security of services is required. These must be adapted to take into
account the type of service being offered and the level of security required. The price of this
flexibility is that security related issues must be provided for every application on a case by
case basis.
Two examples of security enhancements at the Application Layer are provided below. The
first deals with enhancements for electronic mail and the second with a distributed
authentication scheme developed as part of Project Athena [36].
3.2.7.1. PEM
PEM or Privacy Enhanced Mail [8,23,25] provides electronic mail users with security
enhanced procedures for use over the Internet. It uses both public and private key
encryption methods and supports a key management procedure as part of its protocol.
The services provided by PEM include confidentiality, authentication, message integrity
assurance and non-repudiation of origin. Interoperability is provided by making use of the
existing textual mail environment provided by SMTP (RFC822) by translating encrypted
messages into a canonical format prior to using the underlying mail transport facilities.
The PEM system applies security prior to any underlying transport system and can be
regarded as a true end to end security enhancement.
While PEM provides some enhanced services, other are not provided. These include access
control, traffic flow confidentiality address list accuracy routing control, other issues relating
to the reuse of serials by multiple users, assurance of message receipt and non deniability of
receipt, automatic association of acknowledgement with original messages and message
duplication and replay prevention.

PEM works by encapsulating an existing mail message with well defined headers specifying
the format and key retrieval information required for reading/authenticating the message. A
message in such format is translated into canonical format (printable characters) acceptable
to SMTP. On delivery the receiving PEM uses the header information along with key
information provided by the receiver to decode/authenticate the message.
3.2.7.2. Kerberos
Kerberos [36] provides trusted third party authentication services in a distributed network
environment. It does this by maintaining a database of clients and their associated private
keys and using these keys to convince one client that another is really who they say they are.
Once authentication has been established Kerberos can then issue session keys that have a
limited life span. These keys are called tickets and have a one to one relationship between a
client and a server. Once a ticket expires a new ticket must be obtained to gain access to a
service again.
The ticket issuing function can also be delegated to a Ticket Generating Server which is
separate from the original Kerberos authenticator. The database of clients is generally
maintained in a read only fashion and updated offline to reduce the possibility of
compromise.
The implementation of Kerberos requires the modification of many standard operating
system facilities such as login and the BSD 'r' commands so that they use the Kerberos
authentication functions.
3.3. TCP
Having considering networking in general, specific issues concerning the Transmission
Control Protocol (TCP) [30] are discussed below.
TCP is one of a number of protocols originating from the TCP/IP Internet Protocol Suite that
comes from research funded by the Defence Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA).
This suite contains many communication protocols that can be used as the basis for building

large connected networks (internets) that are able to run on a myriad of host platforms over
diverse interconnecting network hardware and services.
As mentioned above, the TCP protocol sits above some underlying network delivery
protocol and has been designed to provide a reliable stream delivery service over a
potentially unreliable network. The relevant position of TCP and some protocols directly
related to it is shown below.
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Fig #9 - TCP's position in the network structure

With the goal of reliability established TCP provides a number of features that characterise
the protocol.
The TCP protocol is a byte oriented stream with application programs transferring data in
blocks of 8-bit bytes making up arbitrary chunks of data. The data formed in such streams is
considered to be without structure or format and it is up to the application to manage or
impose any format at some higher level.
The TCP protocol provides a Virtual Circuit Connection. Two processes communicate
through a conceptual scheme similar to the placement of a telephone call. In this scheme
there are methods of connection (calling) and accepting connections (pickup or answer),
when connections have been established communication can take place until one or both
parties decide to finish a connection (hangup). In the case of errors or unexpected

disconnections, methods are provided to inform the other party that the connection has been
discontinued.
TCP also provides buffering to improve the efficiency of use of any underlying network. An
application program may send single octets of data at a time or huge packets but the TCP
protocol buffers, disassembles or assembles packets or messages then multiplexes
transmission over the network layer of the software. At the other end of the network TCP
will demultiplex packets as required and deliver them to the application in the same order
that they were sent.
TCP provides full duplex connection so that applications can send and receive data on the
same connection "at the same time".
The area of TCP that is of particular interest is the method of establishing sessions or
connections between co-operating processes. It is at the point of establishing connections
that it is most convenient to establish encryption. The distinction is made between the
architecture of establishing a connection, the formats and protocols of messages involved in
making a connection and the implementation details of making a connection. These three
differing levels have an impact on what is possible within the scope of TCP.
3.3.1. The architecture of a TCP connection
The architecture of a connection refers to a high level description of the activities of
establishing a connection. It does not concern itself with the details of the meaning of bit
patterns within a frame or packet.
The basic architecture of a TCP connection is a three way handshake. This provides the level
of reliability needed for a full duplex connection oriented protocol where it may happen that
two processes decide to initiate a connection with each other simultaneously. The three way
handshake is designed to provide correct synchronisation regardless of the underlying
delivery mechanism and regardless of the order of actions taken by processes attempting to
establish a connection. When two processes are about to establish a connection we can call

one the client and one the server. Without loss of generality the client can be said to initiate
the session when it sends a SYN [synchronisation) message to the server. The client enters a
state known as SYN-SENT and waits. The server will, at some time in the future, receive a
SYN message and will respond by sending a SYN message with an ACK [acknowledge)
attached. The server will then enter a state known as SYN-RECEIVED. At some later time
the client will receive the SYN-ACK message and will répond with a plain ACK message.
The client will then enter the ESTABLISHED state. The server then receives the ACK
message and enters the ESTABLISHED state. Thus a connection is established by three way
handshake.

Server Program

Client Program

Fig #8 - Establishing a connection

The diagram shows the progress of a three way handshake. Time travels down the page and
messages of appropriate type are indicated by arrows. State transitions are shown along the
respective sides of the client and server.

3.4. Formats and Protocols of TCP
Formats and protocols give meaning and semantics to bit patterns within data packets used
to express the architecture of TCP. This is the case with both TCP and its associated IP
protocol. The basic structure of the TCP message is a TCP header followed by arbitrary data.
The header is padded to a 32 bit boundary as is the data.
The header area contain a minimum of five 32 bit words with a format shown below.

0

Format of a TCP Header
4
10
16
24
Source Port
Destination Port

32

Sequence Number
Acknowledgement Number
Window
Hlen Reserved Code Bits
Urgent Pointer
Checksum
Padding
Options
Data
• • •

Fig #9
The source and destination ports identify the end points of the connection. Host addresses
are dealt with by the IP Protocol which encapsulates the TCP message. The sequence
number identifies the place in the input stream where the data in this packet belongs. The
acknowledgement number identifies the next position expected to be received. Hlen is the
number of 32 bit words in this header and is used as an offset to find the beginning of the
data. Code Bits indicate whether the current message contains urgent data, whether this
message has a valid acknowledgement field i.e. is an ACK, whether data on this connection
was pushed i.e. buffers explicitly flushed by application request, whether we want to reset

the connection i.e. hangup, whether this is a SYN message and whether this is the last
message of this connection. The window field indicates how much buffer space is available
on the sending host. This field can be used to restrict sending data when there is no buffer to
save it. Checksum provides a method of verifying the integrity of the header. The urgent
pointer (when valid) indicates the offset of out of band data (Out of band data is discussed
below).

3.4.1. Option fields
Following the urgent pointer we find the optional option fields. Option fields provide TCP
with a mechanism to pass relatively small arbitrary messages outside the standard data
stream. The original TCP protocol standard defines the format of option lists as follows.

8 bits

8 bits

n bytes

Fig #10 - Format for Option fields

Where "Option #" is an option number between 0 and 255. Length provides the number of
bytes that the total option field contains (including the Option # and the Length). The data
can be arbitrary data associated with the option. The TCP standard defines three option
numbers:

Fig #11 - End of Options

Option 0 is the end of option list option. This option can be used to terminate a list of
multiple option fields in an option list. Note the length field is two bytes, these being the
option number and the length field itself.

Fig #12 - Nop Option

Option 1 is the nop option. This option is a no operation option and is simply a place holder
in an option list. Again the length field is two bytes.

8 bits

8 bits

16 bits

Fig #13 - MSS Option

Option 2 is the Maximum Segment Size (MSS) which allows a TCP to set the maximum size
of a message that it is willing to accept.
All other option are undefined but available for future use. Option fields will be used to
carry indications that encrypted data streams are in use and this is discussed at length below.
3.4.2. Data

Data consists of an arbitrary number of bytes. Each byte is assigned a conceptual sequence
number that defines its position in the datastream.

Typically data is delivered in the order prescribed by the sequence numbers. There is,
however, a facility that allows data to be delivered out of this strict sequence. The so called
Urgent Pointer gives the position of such "out of sequence" data and one of the Code Bits
indicates the existence of the urgent data. When a TCP receives a message with urgent data it
immediately delivers this data to the application, bypassing any data that is expected or
already buffered.

3.5. Implementation of a connection in TCP

The details of the implementation of TCP are dependent on the method of delivery. A TCP
can reside in a variety of hardware and software platforms. These range from special
purpose routers and protocol converters to general purpose hosts. In a host based
environment the TCP can be part of the kernel or part of the user's address space depending
on the type of host. The particular implementation discussed below runs TCP as part of a
kernel on an inexpensive multiuser host.

4. Linux
Linux is a POSIX compliant implementation of UNIX written for inexpensive multiuser
hosts, predominantiy Intel 80486 based microprocessors. The Linux project was started to
provide a shareware version of UNIX with full source code distribution. Various utilities,
compilers and tools from the GNU project are used to build and maintain the system.
Currently the Linux operating system is selfsupporting, i.e. support and development of
Linux can be undertaken from within a Linux environment. Support is provided for a range
of hardware including video adapters, disks, CD-ROMS, sound cards, modems, tape drives.
The implementation used and described below consists of an Osborne 80486 based PC with
a 240MB Quantum Fixed Disk and VD24X Diamond Video Adapter running Linux Version
1.0.8, gcc version 2.5.8, X11R5 and Cornell tcsh 6.04.
4.L Linux module organisation
Linux is organised in a hierarchy of directories that reflect the modular design of the system.
Typically system source code is located in a directory called Unux. This linux directory is
typically located in lusrjsrc but this need not be so.
The operating system module libraries are then arranged in directories according to their
subsystem functions. Such functions include lib that is used to hold kernel libraries,/s which
hold file system code etc. All network related code is held in the net directory. This directory
holds the highest level interface code for the socket calls made by user programs. The net
directory is further broken down into subdirectories containing implementations of the
various domain types. Among the domain types is Internet which is found in the inet
directory. This contains the source code for the entire internet suite as well as the extension
proposed by this paper.
At execution time, linkage between the highest levels of the socket interface and tiie specific
implementations is provides by blocks of function pointers which are initialised dynamically
at kernel startup time with domain initialisation routines.

A small part of the directory structure of Linux is shown in the diagram below.
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(read_write.c^

Fig #14 - Linux source code directory

4.2. A tour of the Linux Networking Kernel Code
4.2.1. The client
We consider the actions that take place inside the kernel as a result of the execution of two
simple client-server programs. The client program shown below opens an internet socket
stream resulting in the return of a file descriptor [sock], initialises a data structure [sin] with
values specifying the host and port that will be connected to, it connects the socket to that
host/port then reads what is sent and prints it. Finally it closes the file descriptor [sock) and
exits.

^include <stdio.h>
^include <sys/tYpes.h>
^include <sys/socket.h>
^include <netinet/in.h>
^include <netdb.h>
ii^include " c - s . h "
^define BUFLEN 128
main(argc,argv)
int argc;
char * a r g v [ ] ;
{
int sock,n;
s t r u c t sockaddr_in sin;
unsigned char buf[BUFLEN];
sock = socket(AF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,0);
i f ( sock == -1 ) {
f p r i n t f ( s t d e r r , " S o c k e t returned - 1 \ n " ) ;
exit(-1);
}
bzero((char * ) & s i n , s i z e o f ( s i n ) ) ;
sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
sin.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(MYIP);
sin.sin_port = htons(MYPORT);
i f ( connect(sock,(struct sockaddr *)&sin,sizeof(sin)) < 0 ) {
f p r i n t f ( s t d e r r , " c o u l d not connectNn");
exit(-l);
}
while (( n = read (sock,buf,BUFLEN) ) > 0 ) {
buf[n] = ' \ 0 ' ;
puts(buf);
}
fputs("\n",stdout);
close(sock);
exit(0);
Fig #15 - A simple client program

4.2.2. The server
The server program provides data that is read by the client. Firstly the server creates an
internet socket stream and assigns it to a file descriptor [sock], the server then initialises a
structure for holding information about future communication links [sin). The values in this
sin structure indicate that it will be an internet connection accepting connection on any

incoming address that this host may be known as and on a specific TCP port number
[MYPORT]. The socket [sock) and the address structure (sm) are then bound with the bind call
and the file descriptor is set into a passive state with the listen call, at some time in the future
a new file descriptor [wsock) is created when the client and server programs rendezvous via
the clients connect. The server writes a message to the newly created file descriptor [wsock),
closes its files and exits. The total result of the above is that the message "Hello World" is
printed by the client.

^include <stdio.h>
^include <sys/types.h>
^include <sys/socket.h>
^include <sys/ioctl.h>
^include <netinet/in.h>
^include <netdb.h>
^include "c-s.h"
main(argc,argv)
int argc;
char *argv[];
{
int sock,wsock,len;
struct sockaddr_in sin,fsin;
unsigned char pch[] = "Hello World";
sock = socket(AF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,0);
if ( sock == -1 ) {
fprintf(stderr,"Socket returned -1\n");
exit(-1);

}
bzero((char *)&sin,sizeof(sin));
sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
sin.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
sin.sin_port = htons(MYPORT);
if (bind(sock,(struct sockaddr *)&sin,sizeof(sin)) == -1 ) {
fprintf(stderr,"bind returned an errorXn");
exit(-1);

}
if ( listen(sock,5) < 0 ) {
fprintf(stderr,"listen could not listen?\n");
exit(-1);

}
wsock = accept(sock,(struct sockaddr *)&fsin,&len);
if ( wsock < 0 ) {
fprintf(stderr,"Accept failedXn");
exit(-1);

}
write(wsock,pch,strlen(pch));
close(wsock);
close(sock);
exit(0);
Fig #16 - A simple server program

We now consider the view from the kernel's side which is considerably more complex. The
server is considered first as the client would exit with an error if the server was not ready to

accept connections.
4.2.3. The Server

4.2.3.1. socket
On making the call to socket the server enters the kernel through the _system_call entry point
in linux/kemel/sys_call.S. The system routine to be executed is held in the eax register of
the CPU and is used as an offset into a table {_sys_calljable) which forms the address that is
then called by the 80486 call instruction. This call leads to the execution of the sys_socketcall
function in linux/net/socket.c
The parameters to the sys_socketcall routine are the type of socket call (socket, bind/connect
... etc) which is encoded as an integer and the arguments relevant to the call. This allows a
simple switch statement to be used to call the relevant routine. In this case sock_socket which
is also located in linux/net/socket.c.
The sock_socket routine takes as an argument the familiar family, type and protocol
parameters of the application program socket call. It firstly searches the kernel's domain
protocol table until it finds a matching family, which in this case will be the

AFJNET

domain. The protocol domain structure contains the necessary linkages between families of
domains and their underlying subroutines. Having found the family of domains it then finds
a free socket structure from the sockets array (defined in this file) by calling the subroutine
sockjilloc.
The socket structure which is returned from the sockjilloc is then partially initialised and
completes its creation with a call through a pointer to a create function held in the domain
protocol structure. In this case the called routine is inetjcreate in linux/net/inet/sock.c. The
call to this routine represents the first real transition between protocol independent code and
protocol specific code.
The inet_create allocates a new structure called a sock to hold information necessary to
maintain a AFJNET

connection. It initialises this structure and links the necessary TCP

routines through another type of protocol structure specific to AFJNET

domains. It then

links this sock into the socket structure allocated above in sock_socket. Finally the inetjcreate
routine calls a protocol specific initialisation routine, which for AFJNET

domains is a null

routine.
N o w w e return to sock_socket and allocate an operating system file descriptor through the
routine getjd

in linux/net/socket.c. This ensures that calls to read and write will be

subsequently passed on to the appropriate handler routines. Sock_socket now returns the file
descriptor to sys_socket which in turn returns to the user through the systemjcall gateway.
4.2,3.2. bind
The bind system call ends u p at sys_socketcall following the same path as socket. A t this point
the switch statement takes us to sockjbind in lLnux/net/socket.c which simply ensures that
the file descriptor passed as a parameter is valid and calls the underlying bind routine
inetjbind.
The inet_bind routine does some error checks and then copies the requested Internet TCP
address structure from users address space into the relevant internal tables and sets some
parameters where default values have not been specified. It then places the socket into the
domain socket array with its appropriate port number.
By the time the bind call has completed data structures in the kernel have been established
from the file descriptor fd through to the actual TCP specific parameters held in the sock
structure. This is shown below.
The current pointer gives the location in the kernel's task structure array of the currently
active process. The filp array is the array of file descriptors within the task structure of a
process.
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socket
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Fig #17 - Data Structures within the kernel after a bind call.

4.2.3.3. listen
The listen calls ends up at sys_socketcall following the same path as socket. At this point the
switch statement takes us to sockjisten in linux/net/socket.c which uses the file descriptor
passed as a parameter to look up the kernel file pointer associated with this descriptor by
calling sockfdjookup in linux/net/socket.c. Having found the file it then looks up the inode
associated with the file using the sockijookup routine also in linux/net/socket.c Finally
sockjisten calls inetjisten to initialise fields associated with the sock structure and sets a flag
in the socket structure to accept connections.
4.2.3.4. accept
The accept call ends up at sys_socketcall following the same path as socket. At this point the
switch statement takes us to sock_accept. sock_accept uses the file descriptor to return the
kernel file using sockfdjookup

in linux/net/socket.c which in turn uses the file and

sockijookup

in linux/net/socket.c to obtain the inode which points to the socket. The state of

the socket is checked to ensure that it is in an appropriate state to be used in an accept call and
then a n e w socket is allocated with sockjilloc. Having obtained the socket, its contents are now
initialised b y using the inet_dup routine in linux/net/socket.c which simply calls inetjcreate
using the original socket's sock protocol.
The AFJNET

specific accept routine inetjiccept

in linux/net/socket.c is now called.

inet_accept starts by deallocating any storage allocated to the data field in the new socket. It
then calls the TCP specific tcp_accept in linux/net/inet/tcp.c which waits until a packet
comes for it using a loop on the getjirstr

from linux/net/inet/skbuff.c. When the buffer

arrives the sock associated with this buffer is returned. This returns us to inetjiccept which
assigns the returned sock to its socket, sets the TCP state to TCP_SYN_RECV and waits to
establish a connection in the TCP_ESTABLISHED state by the usual TCP threeway
handshaking method.
A t the end of this w e have a new socket connection established with the existing process.
This is used to carry further messages.

4.2.3.5. write
The

write

call

enters

the

kernel

though

the

usual

_system_caU entry

point

in

linux/kemel/sys_call.S. This leads to a call to sysjvrite in linux/fs/read_write.c which does
a few error checks and then does an indirect call though a pointer to sock_write. sockjwrite in
linux/net/socket.c calls inetjurite in linux/net/inet/sock.c which calls tcpjvrite though the
protocol table associated with this socket, tcpjvrite in linux/net/inet/tcp.c loops until all of
the data to be sent has been processed. Inside the loop tcpjvrite either creates a buffer to
send and sends it or creates a partial buffer and queues that partial buffer. There are two
places in the code where the memcpyjromfs routine is called to fetch user data from the user
address space, one in the area where complete buffers are sent and the other where partial
buffers are built.

4,2.3.6. close

The close call enters the kernel though the usual _system_call entry point in
linux/kemel/sys_call.S. This leads to a call to sysjolose in linux/fs/open.c. sysjclose calls
closeJp in linux/fs/open.c which calls sockjclose though the fanuliar function protocol
pointer, sockjclose in linux/net/inet/sock.c looks up the inode associated with this file and
calls sockjrelease in linux/net/socket.c. sockjrelease calls inetjrelease in linux/net/inet/sock.c
which in turn calls tcpjolose in linux/net/inet/tcp.c which goes through the TCP
handshaking shutdown required as part of the TCP protocol.
4.2.4. The Client
4.2.4.1. socket

The operation of socket in the client program is the same as the server program.
4.2.4.2. connect

The connect enters the kernel in the same way as socket and other socket based calls and
really starts its journey through sockjoonnect in linux/net/socket.c. sockjconnect calls
inetjoonnect in linux/net/inet/sock.c which allocates a socket number if required and calls
the tcpjoonnect routine in linux/net/inet/tcp.c which builds a header with the SYN bit set
and transmits it to the desired host via IP. Control is then passed back to inet_connect where
the kernel sets up a sleep_onJnterrupt state for this process and loops, waiting for either a
timeout or a response to the connect which comes from tcp_rcv (described below).
4.2.4.3. read

The read call enters the kernel though the usual _system_call entry point in
linux/kemel/sys_call.S. This leads to a call to sys_read in linux/fs/read_write.c which does
a few error checks and then does an indirect call though a pointer to sockjread.
sock_read in linux/net/socket.c looks up the socket associated with this file and then calls
inet_read. inet_read in linux/net/inet/sock.c binds the socket if required then calls tcp_read.

tqj_read in linux/net/inet/tcp.c deals with the complexity of reassembling incoming IP
packets which may arrive out of sequence, duplicated or which may be entirely lost. The
tcp_read routine starts by checking the consistency of calling parameters, it then checks
whether we are attempting to receive urgent data. In the case of inetjread we are never
attempting to read out of band data. If no data is available in the receive queue and no other
errors have occurred the kernel reschedules and we resume when data becomes available. If
data is currently available then it is removed from the receive queue and copied to the users
address space. The amount of data available and copied is returned to the user to indicate
success.

4.2.4.4, tcpjrcv
Although never called explicitly by the user, tcpjrcv in linux/net/inet/tcp.c is an important
routine in the overall scheme of things, tcpjrcv is called by ipjcv in linux/net/inet/ip.c as
the routine that handles an incoming IP datagram that is designated for TCP. tcpjrcv finds
the socket that the packet belongs to by using the port, address and socket number and, for
normal data, calls tcpjiata to place this data on the socket's receive queue. This is how
tcpjread can reschedule and return to find data has appeared on the receive queue. The
tcpjrcv routine also takes special action when a packet that requests a new connection
arrives. After determining that a new connection is being requested, tcpjrcv calls the
tcpjconnj-equest

routine

in linux/net/inet/tcp.c which takes the required steps to

rendezvous with a previously "listened" socket which is "accepting".

4.2.4.5. close
The operation of close in the client program is the same as the server program.

5. Design

The general design of the proposed enhancement is now discussed.
5.1. Design Assumptions

It is intended that an enhancement to network security be provided. Any enhancements will
require

design

decisions to be made regarding

the architecture,

protocols and

implementation of the system. Assumptions and alternatives need to be weighed up when
making these decisions.
The first major assumption used to drive the decision making process for this enhancement
is that the proposal will in no way "break" the existing architecture, protocols or operation of
an existing (correct) implementation of TCP/IP. This is a desirable assumption as
interoperability between existing implementations is critical if this enhancement is to be
used in an environment where not all platforms have access to the enhancement.
The second major assumption is that control and security may be maintained by either or
both of the operating system kernel or end user application, depending on configuration and
initialisation. This assumption allows greater flexibility in the use and deployment of this
enhancement.
The third major assumption is that TCP is the appropriate place to put a security mechanism.
This will be discussed shortly.
These assumptions will be tied to the design decisions made in the following paragraphs.
5.2. The Architecture of the Proposed Enhancement

The proposed enhancement consists of a conceptual layer above the TCP protocol in the
network implementation stack. The layer is implemented largely as a separate module
within the operating system kernel and is controlled by parameters set within the kernel at
startup time and subsequently dynamically updated at runtime.

Fig #18 - Security Layer in the Network Protocol Stack

The basic architecture of the security layer is shown below. It consists of four modules: key
exchange, master keys, session keys and the encryption components.
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Fig #19 - Functional Security Layer Modules

5.2.1. Master Keys
Master keys play an important role in the application of encryption to TCP. Each
implementation of TCP must be able to establish secure communication with a known and
trusted partner. Several mechanisms are available to establish this trust but at the end of any
such mechanism there must be delivery of some key that two TCP's can agree on to encrypt
data.
5.2.1.1. Purpose of Master Keys
The purpose of the master keys is to allow overall administration between pairs of TCP's.
This two level approach to key management is similar to the way that we may use an
asymmetric key exchange mechanism to exchange keys for a subsequent (faster) symmetric
encryption operation. The keys used to implement the administrative functions can be
unrelated to subsequent keys and need not even be the same encryption function.

The presence of a mechanism for storing and using master keys is required because the
second design assumption calls for the ability of applications to provide keys for individual
sessions. This would be impractical if a single level key directory was imposed.
5.2.1.2. Initialisation of Master Keys
The master keys are initialised for a TCP by a privileged kernel call which provides the
address of the other partner as well as the key details. Simultaneously the other partner will
register the same key details. This will usually be carried out at system initialisation time
and it is assumed that master key values will change relatively infrequently compared to
session keys.
5.2.1.3. Modification of Master Keys
Master keys can be modified by simply reinitialising them with the same kernel call that is
used to initialise them, previous information for a given address will be over written.
5.2.1.4. Master Keys as the trigger for kernel initiated encryption
It is assumed that encryption may be initiated by either the end user application or the
kernel. This implies that the default use of encryption is disabled, otherwise, the kernel
would always initiate encryption, with the end user only overriding certain parameters. The
"default non encryption" mode of operating also implies that there needs to be a trigger that
will initiate user transparent encryption between TCP's. This trigger is held with the master
keys. On initialisation, the master key for a host has a flag set indicating whether encryption
shall be turned on by default, if this flag is set then appropriate fields will specify the style of
encryption to be used along with some default initialisation vectors where appropriate.
5.2.2. Sessions Keys
Session keys provide the information required to drive the encryption process after session
establishment.

5.2.2.1. Purpose of Session Keys
The purpose of the session key is to provide a unique key that can be shared between
connected TCP sessions. The keys need to be unique (or at least random) because ultimately
a socket belongs to a user process that shares an underlying communications transport
mechanism that can be subject to interception. The association of a unique key with a unique
socket pair provides the level of security that would be required by applications (as opposed
to hosts or networks) that exchange secret data.
5.2.2.2. Storage of Session Keys

Session keys belong to a particular socket and are valid for the life of that socket. Two
options are available to store the session keys. The actual socket structure within the kernel
can be modified to include the key information or an additional structure can be added to
hold the session keys. The second approach was favored as it reduced the impact and
recompilation time on the kernel when changes were made to the session key structure. The
session key structure is linked from the socket structure by a pointer, the memory associated
with this extended socket arrangement is allocated and deallocated along with the socket
structure at the appropriate time in the kernel.
5.2.2.3. Generation of Session Keys

Session keys can be generated in two ways, the kernel can generate a key or the end user can
provide an explicit key that it wishes to exchange.
5.2.2.3.1. Kernel Generated Session Keys

When required, the kernel will generate keys based on a single internal register and the
master key of the host to which it will exchange the keys. The register is updated using a
modulo quadratic hash and this value is passed to the encryption module along with the
master key of the host, the value returned by this encryption is then used as the session key

The modulo quadratic hash provides some, but not a lot, of randomness in the generation of
keys, the randomness and secrecy of the session keys is provided by the encryption of this
hash by the master key of the host concerned. This reduces the chance that another host, that
may know the quadratic hash sequence by establishment of some earlier session key, may be
able to determine the value of a session key for another unauthorised host.
The kernel generated key model is show below:
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Fig #20 - Kernel Generated Session Keys

5.2.2.3.2. End User Generated Session Keys and Initialisation Vectors
As well as kernel generated keys, user applications can supply their own session keys. These
are passed through enhanced kernel calls that are recognized by the security layer and
passed onto the enhanced socket structure belonging to the socket in question.
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Fig #21 - User Supplied Session Keys

5.2.3. Key Exchange Mechanisms
The method of securely exchanging session keys is the most critical aspect of the proposed
enhancement and requires careful decisions to be made regarding architecture. The general
mechanism for exchanging keys is presented along with specific means of key exchange.
In discussing the architecture of key exchange it is assumed that we are actually referring to
the exchange of encrypted session keys and the process of getting a new session key from
one host to another is as follows:
Generate Session Key This is explained above.
Encrypt the new session key with the appropriate master key.
Pass the encrypted key to the partner.
(Partner) decrypt the session key with the master key.
(Partner) store the session key with the appropriate socket.
(Both) use the session key to encrypt and decrypt data.
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Fig #22 - Session Key Processing (SKG - Session Key Generation)

Several methods of actually conducting the exchange can be used. These are outlined below
with some discussion of the relative merits of each style.

5.2.3.1. Using Spare bits in b e TCP header
As outlined in section 3.4 there are a small number of unused bits within the TCP header
that may be used to transmit key information. This method of exchanging keys is considered
undesirable for a number of reasons. Firstly, it contravenes the assumption that this proposal
will not break an existing implementation of TCP RFC 793 [30] states that reserved bits must
be zero. Using these bits for another purpose may result in a correct implementation of TCP
rejecting theses headers. Secondly if this method is used there are only a small number of
spare bits available in a TCP header, typically six, although up to sixteen additional bits may
by obtained when the smallest option list (also sixteen bits) is padded to its required thirty
two bit alignment. This lack of available bits means that when faced with the requirement to
deliver a sixty four bit or even one hundred and twenty eight bit key multiple headers
would be required to carry the key payload. Even with the three way handshake used to

establish a TCP connection it would be difficult to cany moderately large keys without
substantial revision to the TCP protocol itself.
5.2.3.2. Inserting Key information instream

Another method of exchanging encrypted session keys is to embed the keys within the data
stream using some recognisable escape sequence to detect them. This method would be
suitable for an out of band key exchange mechanism (which is discussed below) but its goes
against the general principle of separation of control information and data. This would mean
that significantly less segregation of functionality could take place between the security layer
and the TCP layer with one of these layers being responsible for the scanning of incoming
data streams for possible key sequences and removing them and notifying the other layer of
its operations. The requirement for one layer of a protocol stack to have intimate knowledge
of the protocols, formats and operations of another layer largely goes against the general
design goal of an OSI based protocol stack methodology.

5.2.3.3. Using an external mechanism

It is possible that some preexisting mechanism could be used to exchange encrypted session
keys. This mechanism however, does not solve the problems of keys generation and the
synchronisation of TCP's and its not in line with the architectural model shown in Fig 19
5.2.3.4. Using Option Lists

The final alternative for key exchange that is considered is through the option list
mechanism. Option lists provide both IP and TCP a method of exchanging small amounts of
useful non user data information between TCP's or IP based hosts. As seen previously, the
TCP standard RFC 793 provides for the definition of three recognised option lists. This
leaves considerable scope for the use of additional option definitions which have not been
specifically reserved by the standard. Implementations of TCP ignore unrecognised options
and so the delivery of a non standard option list should not cause a well behaved
implementation of TCP to fail, merely pass on meaningless data to its application.

The maximum amount of data that can be delivered through an option list is considerably
greater that the spare bits provided by the TCP header but not enough to be extravagant will
key exchange ideas. There is insufficient room to pass both inbound and outbound keys and
encryption initialisation vectors for algorithms that require one hundred and twenty eight
bit keys but this can be dealt with as a two way handshake if required.
As a result of the above, the design decision was taken to use Option Lists as the mechanism
to exchange keys.
5.2.3.5. In Band vs Out of Band Key Exchange

Two approaches can be adopted with the decision as to when it is appropriate to send keys
between TCP's. Keys may be exchanged in band, that is, at a point in time that is
synchronised with data transmission, or out of band, that is, a point in time that is not
synchronised with data flow.
If an in band approach is used it seems reasonable that the appropriate point in the
transmission to insert the key exchange is prior to any data being transmitted. The
disadvantage is that flexibility is lost and the option to either discontinue or modify the
mode of operation is also not available. It is also difficult to implement an in band scheme
that uses other than the period prior to data flow to exchange keys without radically altering
the architecture of TCP.
The second approach to key exchange is to use an out of band solution. This can present
potential problems with synchronising data when we are not sure what application layer
programs above in the protocol stack are doing. Particularly if race conditions develop when
applications consume data before a key exchange can take place.
For this final reason an in band key exchange solution adopted with the key exchange being
executed prior to data transmission.

5.2.4. Encryption
The encryption module has two major functions. Firstly to carry out encryption of data
streams where required and secondly to initiate key exchange and session key generation as
explained above.

5.2.4.1. Operation
As seen previously, application programs that wish to communicate with TCP do so via the
various network system calls available [socket, connect, read, write, close). Placed between
these calls and the actual TCP layer is a decision module which will determine if security
related activity will take place. This is implemented as a flag associated with socket structure
and will be be set if security is needed otherwise it will not be set.
If security related activity is to happen read/write calls will be intercepted by the security
layer and actions taken to encrypt/decrypt data as needed. When these actions are
completed data is either encrypted and passed down to the TCP layer (for a write type call)
or decrypted and passed up to the application (for a read type call).
Also, if security related activity is to happen various socket setup calls will be intercepted
and action taken to either swap user provided keys or generate and swap kernel generated
session keys.
5.2.4.2. Variable Enciyption methods
Part of the key exchange process involves selecting the encryption scheme to be used during
encryption operations.
For maximum flexibility, it is desirable to allow multiple methods of encryption to be
specified. The type of encryption function to be used as well as its mode of operation is
coded as a single byte and is passed as part of the key exchange process. The proposed
enhancement allows for the use of any general purpose encryption scheme, although the
trial implementation was restricted to block symmetric ciphers modified for stream mode
operation. The method of encryption is also stored in the extended socket structure along

with session keys.
5.3. Comparison with other Proposals
Several other proposals for security related services within the TCP/IP protocol suite have
recently emerged. swIPe [19] was mentioned previously as an early investigation that was
subsequently superseded. While the focus of some of these activities goes beyond the scope
of this proposal and considerable work is still in progress it is worth reviewing and
contrasting the very recent work of the lEFT IPSEC Working Group through a number of
RFC's that have been proposed.
5.3.1. Introduction to IPSEC
The lEFT IPSEC Working Group is broadly concerned with issues of authentication and
privacy over Internet Networks. Some recent RFC's have included:
• RFC 1825 - Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol [5]
• RFC 1826 - IP Authentication Header [6]
• RFC 1827 - IP Encapsulating Security Payload [7]
These will be discussed and compared with the design and implementation proposed above.
5.3.1.1. RFC 1825 - Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol
RFC 1825 provides for the design of an architecture for security of the IP protocol. It has two
basic extensions to IP Version 4 and IP Version 6, these are, an authentication scheme and a
privacy scheme. The aim of the authentication scheme is to provide a host to host or host to
gateway (or inter-gateway) method of verifying the source of datagrams. The aim of the
privacy scheme is to provide both authentication and confidentiality of datagrams between
hosts and gateways.
Central to RFC 1825 is the concept of the Security Association which includes parameters
used to establish and maintain security between hosts in a unidirectional fashion. Security
Associations are linked via a Security Parameter Index (SPI) between hosts. The SPI maps a

given user/host combination to a Security Association.
This RFC has design objectives which attempt to minimise the impact of authentication
schemes and privacy schemes and to provide a range of encryption methods as well as
internationally acceptable defaults.
The authentication scheme is known as Authentication Header (AH) and this scheme is
described more thoroughly in RFC 1826. [6]
The privacy scheme is known as Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and this scheme is
described more thoroughly in RFC 1827. [7]
These two schemes can be used independently or together to provide the implementation of
a range of security policies. The policies on key management are left open with a number of
suggestions about automatic key distribution being made. This RFC provides for two
methods of keying, either host based, where exactly one key per host pair exists or user
based where multiple keys per host pair exist. The RFC suggests that user based keying be
available in all implementations.
5.3.1.2. RFC 1826 - IP Authentication Header
The IP Authentication scheme known as Authentication Header (AH) works by adding
authentication data to an IP header. Typically for IP Version 4 this authentication data is
added between the standard header and the next highest protocol header.

IP Version 4 Header
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Fig #23 - IP Version 4 AH Datagram Format

The AH header has a fixed structure which includes the authentication data. This is
calculated using a cryptographically strong, one-way function over the entire IP datagram

replacing, with binary zeros, those fields that routinely change during transmission, (e.g.
TTL). The requirement to calculate the authentication data over the entire IP datagram
implies that fragmentation must be completed prior to authentication and special action
must be taken to deal with IP Option Lists that are modified during transmission.
On receipt of an authenticated datagram, a host computes the AH header based on the data
received and an implied zero authentication data area. It then compares this computed AH
header authentication data with that received in the actual AH header, if the two match then
the datagram is accepted otherwise it is rejected and the event logged.

5.3.1.3. RFC 1827 - IP Encapsulating Security Payload

The IP Privacy scheme, known as Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP), works by
encrypting the data of a payload contained within an IP datagram. Two modes of operating
are available, in Tunnel mode an entire IP datagram is encrypted and placed within another
IP datagram (as in the swIPe proposal) using a form of IPIP (IP within IP protocol), in
Transport mode the ESP header is placed between the IP header and the encrypted transport
message. ESP IP datagrams are recognised by the assignment of Protocol Number 50 to the
Protocol field of IPv4 or the Next Header field of IPv6.
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Fig #24 - ESP Modes of Operation
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RFC 1825 states that ESP may provide authentication as well as privaq^. If authentication is
required is must be a byproduct of the encryption process in either Transport or Tunnel
Mode. By default, RFC 1827 must support DES-CBC for the encryption of messages, this by
itself will not provide any authentication or non-repudiation properties but the RFC allows
for the implementation of schemes that do.
Operation of both modes is straight forward, on receipt of a Tunnel Mode datagram the host
will find the Security Association required for this datagram and use it to decrypt the entire
IP datagram that has been "tunneled", this IP datagram is now passed back to the IP stack for
processing. In Transport mode, the host will find the Security Association required for the
message and decrypt the message associated with the next highest transport protocol. When
decrypted the message is passed to the next highest layer in the protocol stack. In both cases
any errors in decryption or authentication will cause the datagram to be dropped and the
error event recorded.
5.3.2. Comparison between the proposed enhancement and IPSEC

Several major differences are apparent between the work of the lEFT IPSEC and this
proposal. These will be discussed along with some recent associated criticism of the lEFT
IPSEC approach.
5.3.2.1. TCP vs IP level encryption

The major difference between lEFT IPSEC and this proposal is the point in the protocol stack
where the functionality is provided. The lEFT IPSEC RFC's concentrate entirely on the IP
protocol whereas this proposal really lies above the TCP protocol as depicted in Fig #18.
There are some disadvantages in placing security extensions in both of these areas however
interfering with the IP protocol seems to be more disruptive since:
• it requires that all hosts and gateways be able to process AH or ESP datagrams. This
may pose some backward compatibility problems since it would be impossible to
retrospectively mandate this functionality for IPv4.

• by its nature it has to be mandated for the IPv6 protocol which will cause increasing
complexity at this level of the network layer.
• it seriously limits the ability of gateways and routers to deal with upper layers of the
protocol stack unless significant relaxation of privacy and authentication requirements
are allowed. This is against the whole thrust of the approach.
• it mandates the use of the features prescribed regardless of the upper level protocol. UDP
and TCP are both affected by IPSEC when it may or may not be appropriate to do so,
particularly with UDP which may be used by applications (like Secure NFS) that have
their own security mechanisms.
On the other hand using the point just above TCP in the protocol stack (as proposed) has its
own disadvantages:
• it offers no security to any headers. The proposal as outlined, only protects the data
portion of the transport layer message, ESP in Tunnel Mode secures (and potentially
authenticates) the entire IP datagram.
• it is limited in application to TCP based applications. It may happen that in future
protocols are developed with different design objectives to TCP, these will not be able to
avail themselves of this proposal.
Whereas UDP is somewhat a degenerate form of TCP, future protocols may not be and
may include such features as class of service, real time response combined with more
tradition features like connection oriented communication that are seen in TCP. Any new
protocol could run in a secured environment under IPSEC but not under the proposed
solution.
These are also some advantages in using a point above TCP over IP.
• it is conceptually easier to implement streams ciphers and other schemes that require
reliable connection oriented services. IP by its very nature can loose datagrams and this

makes using scheme that maintain state information based on previously received data
more difficult to implement.

• it is conceptually easier to implement a new layer in the protocol stack than augment an
existing one. This proposal forms a new layer which although interacting with TCP is
largely decoupled from it. This was not possible for the IPSEC group and led to obvious
problems such as dealing with fragmentation and changing option lists.
• the security mechanism is closer to the application and in some sense spends less time in
an unencrypted format. This may be relevant when facilities such as TCP message
tracing are available on systems using IPSEC thus allowing the viewing of clear text
messages at a level between the application and the security mechanism.
On these arguments TCP was selected as an appropriate place to put a new security layer.

5.3.2.2. Privacy
The entire thrust of the proposal outlined here is privacy of transport level data. While this is
one objective of the lEFT IPSEC RFC's there are many others including authentication and
variable modes of operation. Rogaway [32] has obliquely criticised the complexity of the
IPSEC model of ESP stating that it should be restricted to only privacy issues and that
authentication and integrity should be placed elsewhere. This is precisely the thrust of the
proposed enhancement which architecturally provides one simple mode of operation which
gives privacy to the data associated with a connection oriented message passing protocol.
Rogaway [32] also recommends a mode of operation that includes the efficient use of
encrypting hardware, this proposal allows for such a mode of operation.

5.3.2.3. Authentication
The lEFT IPSEC group RFC's provide for authentication. As stated above this proposal does
not address the issue of authentication, although, as with ESP, it would be possible to
implement an authentication scheme based around the encrypting and decrypting functions
which was beyond the actual functionality of the proposal itself.

5.3.2.4. Master Key Exchange
Both lEFT IPSEC and this proposal defer the issue of key management. Both use a default
manual method of key dissemination but both would benefit from the implementation of
protocols such as ISAKMP [29], Photuris [24], CDP [1], SKIP [2] and variants [3,4].
5.3.2.5. Bandwidth considerations
Both the lEFT IPSEC proposal and the proposal set out here have considerable
computational implications because encryption of streams of data are involved. The lEFT
IPSEC RFC's repeatedly mention the latency impact that encryption and decryption of IP
datagrams will have. The proposed enhancement implemented below will also be shown to
have significant impact on throughput and communication latency. This is not surprising
given the nature of encryption. The impact of encryption and decryption can however be
mitigated by the use of efficient hardware assisting in the encryption and decryption [32].
With the lEFT IPSEC RFC's, another latency effect can be observed due to the increasing size
of IP datagram packets. Each IP datagram sent between hosts or gateways carries an either
an ESP header or another entire IP datagram header (in the case of ESP) or an AH header (in
the case of AH). Given that IP traffic tends to be either very large packets or very small
packets, this overhead on every IP packet could be significant in a constrained bandwidth
network.
Compared to this, the proposed enhancement provides a fixed size, one off exchange of data
on a per session basis making it potentially more efficient in a constrained network
bandwidth environment.

6. Implementation
The enhanced functionality to be provided is now described. This involves the modification
to the formats of TCP option lists and the addition of data structures and code modules to
interpret and act on the new formats defined.
The purpose of the enhanced functionality is to provide a method of encrypting the data
associated with messages passed between TCPs.
The extent of the encryption is the data portion of the TCP message and the encryption of
keys passed between TCPs at session establishment time.
To allow the use of stream oriented ciphers, the problem of dealing with urgent data is
ignored. When urgent data is sent or received it is simply passed in clear text between TCPs.
This simplifies the implementation and it could be argued improves security since most
urgent data are typically well known escape sequences that may provide clues to a
cryptanalyst using a known ciphertext attack.
The enhanced functions provided are implemented in two parts. Firstly additional data
structures are added to the kernel and secondly additional code to provide control and
encryption schemes within the kernel.
6.1. Data Structures
Two additional data structures have been added to the kernel.
The crypt_proto structure provides the linkage and state information for individual sock
structures within the kernel. Each sock structure has two cryptjjroto structures associated
with it, one is for the sending stream, one is for the incoming stream.
The fields within this structure hold pointers to the encryption/decryption functions. These
are initialised from a global cryptjjroto array structure called the crypt_register in
linux/net/inet/tcp_crypt.c or as a result of ioctl commands or arriving TCP options.
The key and iv fields provide a storage area for user supplied initialisation parameters. The
encryption specific fields lokijits, lokikeys, desjits, ks, ksjriple, bitsjriple, bits and sapphire

provide a place for encryption schemes to hold state information, similarly state and estate
allow the protocol handler routines to hold general state information. The protocol field
holds the numeric value of the current protocol in operation and is linked to the symbolic
names defined in linux/net/inet/tcp_crypt.h.

struct crypt_proto {
v o i d ( * e n c r y p t o r ) ( s t r u c t c r Y p t _ p r o t o * p c p , u n s i g n e d char *,int len);
v o i d { * d e c r Y p t o r ) ( s t r u c t c r y p t _ p r o t o * p c p , u n s i g n e d char *,int len);
unsigned long key[2];
unsigned long iv[2];
unsigned long bits[2];
u n s i g n e d char
unsigned long

loki_bits[8];
lokikeys[ROUNDS];

unsigned char des_bits[8];
des_key_schedule ks;
des_key_schedule ks_triple;
unsigned long bits_triple[2];
struct sapphire sapphire;
int p r o t o c o l ;
int s t a t e ;
int e s t a t e ;

};
Fig #25 - The crypt_proto structure

The host2host_encrypt structure holds a record for remote hosts where kernel initiated
encryption will take place.
The status field indicates whether this particular record is free, active or deleted. The address
is the IP address in network byte order binary. The protocol_out field indicates the presence of
an outgoing encryption scheme for this address. The masterJ^ey is used to encrypt the option
fields as they are passed between hosts during session establishment. The default_key and
default Jv fields provide for known starting points for schemes that require them.
The last three fields provide the same information as the previous three but for the incoming
schemes.

The global array holding the host2host_encrypt structures is called tcp_encryptJiost2host and is
located in linux/net/inet/tcp_crypt.c.

struct host2host_encrypt {
int status;
unsigned long address;
int protocol_out;
unsigned long master_key_out[2];
unsigned long default_key_out[2] ;
unsigned long default_iv_out[2];
int protocol_in;
unsigned long master_key_in[2];
unsigned long default_key_in[2];
unsigned long default_iv_in[2];

};
Fig #26 - The host2host_encrypt structure

6.2. Modes of operation
To allow maximum flexibility in operation, three modes of encryption are available. The first
is "program initiated and controlled host to host encryption" where a client and server
program initiate and control the operation of underlying kernel services. The next is
"program initiated, kernel controlled encryption" where one side of a client/server program
pair will initiate encryption but the kernel will then negotiate operation and control without
need for further intervention by the other client/server. The final mode of operation is
"kernel initiated and controlled encryption" where the kernel will automatically initiate
encryption services between hosts without the need for client/server knowledge or
intervention.

6.2.1. Program initiated and controlled operation
This mode of operation allows applications to control all aspects of encryption. It is suitable
when developers wish to specifically enforce patterns of usage and are prepared to control
aspects of operation including key distribution and initialisation of encryption services. This
mode of operation represents an enhancement to the socket implementations typical of

UNIX environments but does not represent a change to the architecture of TCP itself since
the underlying formats and protocols have not altered.
Program initiated and controlled operation works by introducing six new ioctl commands to
the socket interface. When invoked they cause the kernel to take actions that enable and
disable encryption services, set keys and set initial encryption vectors (where relevant) for
various encryption schemes.
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Fig #27 - Program Initiated and Controlled Operation

6.2.1.1. loctl's for program initiated and controlled operation
The SIOCSICRYPTP command (Socket lOCtl Set Incoming CRYPT Protocol) takes as an
argument the required underlying encryption scheme number that has been defined in the
<sockios.h> include file. It uses this number to locate the associated crypt_proto structure
associated with the desired encryption scheme. The kernel sets the receiving crypt protocol
structure to be a copy of the global crypt_proto structure. Should the argument be out of
range then an error is returned.

if

}

( i o c t K s o c k , S I O C S I C R Y P T P , T C P _ C R y P T _ C F B ) != 0 ) {
fprintf(stderr,"SIOCSCRYPTP - Not supportedXn");
exit(-1);

Fig #28 - A typical code fragment ioctl setting the Encryption Scheme.

The SIOCSOCRYPTP command (Socket lOCtl Set Outgoing CRYPT Protocol) takes as an
argument the required underlying encryption scheme number that has been defined in the
<sockios.h> include file. It uses this number to locate the associated crypt_proto structure
associated with the desired encryption scheme. The kernel sets the sending crypt protocol
structure to be a copy of the global crypt_proto structure. Should the argument be out of
range then an error is returned. In operation the kernel immediately commences the
encryption scheme chosen as soon as the next read or write operation is performed.
The SIOCSICKEY command (Socket lOCtl Set Incoming Crypt KEY] takes as an argument a
pointer to an array of unsigned longs which are used to initialise the cipher key for the
incoming socket. Depending on the encryption scheme being utilised this call may be used
or ignored. With the DES scheme in ECB mode and the Loki scheme an optimised key
schedule is generated prior to the first read or write and calls to this command are processed
but have no effect unless done before reading and/or writing are started. Other schemes
may allow dynamic key changes to be catered for. The specifics of this call depend on the
implementation of the scheme.
The SIOCSOCKEY command (Socket lOCtl Set Outgoing Crypt KEY) is analogous to the
SIOCSICKEY command.

unsigned long key[2]; /* DES Key 64 bits */
key[0] = Oxfefefefe; /* Weak keys */
key[1] = Oxfefefefe;
if ( ioctKsock, SIOCSICKEY ,key) != 0 ) {
fprintf(stderr/'SIOCSCKEY - FailureXn");
exit(-1);

}

Fig #29 - A typical code fragment ioctl setting the Encryption Key.

The SIOCSICIV command (Socket lOCtl Set Incoming Initial Vector) takes as an argument a
pointer to an array of unsigned longs which are used to initialise an input vector that can be
used as a starting point for an enciphering scheme. Calls to this function are most effective if
done prior to reading and writing since the implementation of the operation can effect when
an initial vector is used and what the effect of updating an existing vector will be. The initial
vector can be considered a kind of salt used by the encryption schemes when required.
The SIOCSOCIV command (Socket lOCtl Set Outgoing Initial Vector) is analogous to the
SIOCSICIV command except that it applies to the sending stream of a socket.

unsigned long iv[2];
iv[0] = 0x12345678;
iv[1] = 0x87654321;
if ( ioctl(sock, SIOCSICIV ,iv) != 0 ) {
fprintf(stderr/'SIOCSCIV - Failure\n");
exit(-1);

}

Fig #30 - A typical code fragment ioctl setting the Initial Vector.

6.2.2. Program initiated, kernel controlled operation

In program initiated, host controlled mode, one of the client server pair initialises keys,
vectors and encryption schemes prior to the connect or accept calls. At connection time the

keys and initial vectors are exchanged via addition TCP Option fields and encryption is
commenced without the other partner program being aware.
6.2.2.1. Client Initiated Encryption

When a client program wishes to initiate encryption without involvement of the associated
server program it sets up encryption schemes and initial vectors and keys for either or both
of the incoming or outgoing streams using the same ioctl's as program initiated and
controlled case. Prior to the connect it then issues ioctl's to activate the exchange of
information needed to achieve encryption.
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Fig #31 - Client Initiated Encryption

Two ioctl commands are used to activate this exchange. The SIOCSIP command indicates
that the client wishes to exchange key and IV information on its incoming stream. The
SIOCSOP command indicates that the client wishes to exchange key and IV information on
its outgoing stream.
On receiving one of these ioctl's the kernel winds its way through to tcpjoctl

in

linux/net/inet/tcp.c where it sets a bit in the sending stream's state variable so that the
subsequent call to connect can take additional action.

The state variable that is held within the sending streams cryptjjroto structure acts for both
sending and receiving streams. This variable is treated as a set of bits that are set following
calls to ioctl with the SIOCSIP and and SIOCSOP commands. The least significant bit is set
following a SIOCSIP and the next significant bit is set following a SIOCSOP.

MSB

LSB
crypt_proto.state

1/0 1/0
send Incoming key/IV
send Outgoing key/IV

Fig #32 - State information bits within crypt_proto

On the subsequent call to connect TCP enters its usual three way handshake with the client
sending a SYN segment from tcpjconnect in linux/net/inet/tcp.c. This segment contains an
addition option field depending on values held in the sending crypt_proto structure's state
variable.
If the Incoming Key/IV bit is set and the Outgoing Key/IV is not then the kernel builds a
TCPOPT_SRS option field with the following format.
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32

scheme

Encrypted (IV)
Encrypted (IV)
Encrypted (Key)
Encrypted (Key)
Fig #33 - The TCPOPT_SRS Option field format

The first byte is the option number (99) and indicates that this option field contains the key
and initial vector of the connecting client's receiving stream. This is subsequently used to
initialise the sending steam of the server's associated socket. The second byte contains the
length of the option field (20) as specified in the TCP standard. The third field contains the
encryption scheme number that is being used and represents an offset into the global
crypt_register. The fourth byte is padding and contains zero. The next two 32 bit words
contain the 64 bit initial vector. The final two 32 bit words contain a 64 bit key Both of the IV
and Key fields are encrypted with a master key that is shared between hosts.
If the Outgoing key/IV bit is set and the Incoming/IV bits is not set then the kernel build a
TCPOPT_SSS option field with a format similar to a TCPOPT_SRS option field with the
exception that the encrypted IV and key fields belong to the client's sending stream.
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Encrypted (IV)
Encrypted (IV)
Encrypted (Key)
Encrypted (Key)
Fig #34 - The TCPOPT_SSS Option field format

Should both bits be set then a TCPOPT_SBS option field is built with the following structure.

97

36

32

24

16
schemeir

schemeout

Enaypted (IVi^)
Encrypted (IVj^)
Encrypted (Keyin)
Encrypted (Keyi
Encrypted (IVout)
Encrypted (IVout)
Encrypted (Keyout)
Encrypted (Keyout)
Fig #35 - The TCPOPT_SBS Option field format

The schemcin, ^in and Keyin are associated with the client's incoming stream and the
schemeout/ ^'^out and Keyout are associated with the client's outgoing stream.
Having constructed this segment the client's kernel now sends it to the server's kernel.
Following receipt of this segment the server winds up in tcp_rcv in linux/net/inet/tcp.c
where it will process the connection request through the routine tcp_conn_request also in
linux/net/inet/tcp.c. tcp_conn_request calls tcp_option in linux/net/inet/tcp.c where the
option fields are decoded and the appropriate encryption schemes, keys and initial vectors
are established in the server's crypt structures. Thus the encryption mechanism is
established without the intervention of the server program itself.
6.2.2.2. Server Initiated Encryption
When the server wishes to initiate encryption it establishes encryption schemes, keys and the
initial vector as in the program initiated and controlled case. It then calls the SIOCSIP
and/or SIOCSOP ioctl commands prior to accept. This causes the kernel to build one of the
option fields described above and sent it as part of it actions in tcp_conn_request. The client's
kernel receives this segment as part of the session setup handshake process when moving
from SYN_SENT to ESTABLISHED. The client's kernel will receive the segment in tcpjrcv
and make its way to setting the socket state as ESTABLISHED and calling tcp_option. As in
tcp_conn_request the options are decoded and the appropriate schemes, keys and initial
vectors are extracted and encrypted data transfer can commence.
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Fig #36 - Server Initiated Encryption

6.2.3. Kernel initiated and controlled operation
To enable a kernel to initiate and control encryption a global table is established and
maintained to hold information about pairs of hosts that will automatically pass encrypted
messages when sessions are established. This global table is called tcp_encryptJiost2host and
is located in linux/net/inet/tcp_encrypt.c. It contains fields for destinations, schemes and
default key/initial vector values. The table is initialised by a special SIOCSMLSUA (Socket
lOCtl Set Multiple Link Secure User Access) ioctl command which copies values into the next
available slot in the global table. Typically this call is made by a specialised program that is
run as part of the systems initialisation phase.
When sessions are established the kernel checks in tcpjconnect and tcp_conn_request to see if
the destination address appears in the global encryption table. If a destination is found, the
socket's crypt state is modified prior to the building of the segment option lists and normal
processing exchanges encryption details as in the case of program initiated-host controlled
encryption and then encrypted data transfer can take place.
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Fig #37 - Kernel Initiated Encryption

Summary of ioctl commands
SIOCSICRYPTP
SIOCSOCRYPTP
SIOCSICIV
SIOCSOCIV
SIOCSIP
SIOCSOP
SIOCSMLSUA

Option Name
TCPOPT_SRS
TCPOPT_SSS
TCPOPT_SRS

Set Incoming CRYPT Protocol
Set Outgoing CRYPT Protocol
Set Incoming Crypt Initial Vector
Set Outgoing Crypt Initial Vector
Set Incoming Protocol
Set Outgoing Protocol
Set Multiple Link Secure User Access

Summary of TCP Options
Opt#
Function
99
Secure Receiving Stream
98
Secure Sending Stream
97
Secure Both Streams

Length
20
20
36

6.3. Operation of the Encryption routines
All calls to encrypt/decrypt data as it passes to and from user address space are channelled
through the tcp_encrypt

and tcp_decrypt routines in linux/net/inet/tcp_crypt.c. Within

tcp_crypt.c a structure called a crypt_register has been defined which carries the set of
functions used for encrypting and decrypting by the various protocols. A new structure has
been added to the sock structure called a crypt protocol block which is initialised with

pointers to specific functions associated with cryptographic operations as well as sufficient
state information to run the necessary routines. A crypt protocol structure is associated with
inbound and outbound data.
The basic routine to encrypt data is called tcp_encrypt and takes as arguments the socket's
crypt protocol structure, a buffer to be encrypted and the length of the buffer. It checks to
ensure that the encryptor function associated with the crypt protocol structure is not NULL
and then calls this function with the same arguments that were passed to it.
The decryptor routine tcp_decrypt works the same way as tcp_encrypt except that it calls the
decryptor protocol function instead of the encryptor.
Several encryptor/decryptor protocol function exist. These are discussed below.
6.3.1. NULL
The first function, which holds position zero in the crypt_register, is the NULL function. This
allows the system to select a known value as a default and reduce calling overhead from
tcp_encrypt and tcp_decrypt.
6.3.2. tcp_nop_enc
The tcp_nop_enc routine is a no operation encryptor/decryptor. It takes arguments from
tcp_encrypt or tcp_decrypt and returns without making any modifications to the buffer
passed. Since it is a no operation function tcp_nop_enc is used for both encryption and
decryption.
6.3.3. tcp_non_enc
The tcp_non_enc function provides a simple Vigenere cipher scheme for encrypting streams.
The key is made up of eight bytes from the user's supplied key The "non" in tcp_non_enc
refers to a nonsence encryption scheme. It should perhaps have been called tcp_vig_enc.
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Fig #38 - Vigenere Cipher Scheme

6.3.4. tcp_des_cfb_enc & tcp_des_cfb_dec
The tcp_des_cfb_enc routine uses a form of DES encryption in cipher feedback mode. The
tcp_des_cfb_enc first checks to see if it is in an initial state and if so generates an optimised
key schedule which is saved in the crypt protocol block for future use. The routine then
makes a direct call to the underlying des_cfb_encrypt routine in the deslib library, passing the
buffer to be encrypted as both input and output, the previously generated key schedule, a
cipher feedback block to hold intermediate results used by subsequent calls to this function
and a mode of operation, which in this case is DES_ENCRYPT.
The tcp_desc_cfb_dec routine is analogous to tcp_desc_cfb_enc except that the mode of
operation of des_cfb_encrypt is DES_DECRYPT.
In both cases the output buffer is encrypted/decrypted in place and passed directly back to
the calling routine.

tcp_des_cfb_enc

Fig #39 - DES Cipher Feedback Mode

6.3.5. tcp_des_ecbe
The tcp_des_ecbe routine uses DES in electronic codebook mode to generate "random" bit
patterns that are XOR'ed with the output stream one byte at a time. The socket protocol
encryption data structure holds these bits patterns eight bytes at a time and uses them on the
input stream as required. When a new set of bits is required the previous set of bytes is used
as input to DES with the original key giving a new set of bytes to XOR into the outout
stream. In this way the input and ciphering mechanism are totally segregated.

IV (64 bits)

DES in ECB Mode
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64 Bits
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Plaintext Input

e

— • Encrypted Output

Fig #40 - DES Electronic Codebook Mode

6.3.6. tcp_enloki
The tcpjmloki routine operates in the same fashion as DES in electronic codebook mode.

Fig #41 - Loki Mode of Operation

6.3.7. tcp_des_3ecb
The Triple DES version of the DES routine functions in the same way as the single mode DES
function. The exception being that the two keys required come from both the 64 bit user key
supplied with the SIOSCIKEY ioctl as well as the 64 bit initial vector supplied with the
SIOSCIV ioctl or their respective equivalent outgoing or host to host default values.
6.3.8. tcp_des_3cbc
The Triple DES version of the cipher feedback mode of operation works in the same manner
as the single mode DES cipher feedback mode with the same exceptions as the tcp_des_3ech
operation above.
6.3.9. sapphire_enc and tcp_sapphire_dec
The sapphire_enc and tcp_sapphire_dec routines operate using a sapphire structure held within
each crypt_proto structure. The sapphire structure and its associated user key are initialised
prior to the first byte of an output/input stream being encrypted/decrypted. The key is

made up of 32 bytes formed by the key and initial vector supplied by the SIOCSIKEY and
SIOCSIV ioctl's of their respective equivalent outgoing or host to host default values.

Plaintext

ciphertext

Fig #42 - Sapphire Mode of Operation

Symbolic Name
TCP_CRYPT_NUL
TCP_CRYPT_NOP
TCP_CRYPT_NON
TCP_CRYPT_CFB
TCP_CRYPT_DES
TCP_CRYPT_LOK
TCP_CRYPT_TRI
TCP_CRYPT_TRF
TCP_CRYPT_SAP

Summary of Supported Encryption Schemes
Description
Encyptor
Place holder
NULL
Encrypt with nop
tcp_nop_enc
Nonsence encryption scheme
tcp_non_enc
DES Cipher Feedback mode
tcp_des_cfb_enc
DES Electronic Codebook Mode tcp_des_ecbe
Loki 91
tcp_enloki
tcp_des_3ecb
Triple-DES ECB
tcp_des_3cbc
Triple-DES CBC
tcp_sapphire_enc
Sapphire

Decryptor
NULL
tcp_nop_enc
tcp_non_enc
tcp_des_cfb_dec
tcp_des_ecbe
tcp_enloki
tcp_des_3ecb
tcp_des_3cbc
tcp_sapphire_dec

6.4. Adding a scheme
The process of adding a new encryption scheme to the Linux kernel involves adding new
definitions and code to the modules within the TCP implementation of the system. After
some preliminary work adding a new scheme is relatively straightforward. The steps
required are outlined below.
6.4.1. Review
An initial review of the source code containing the proposed new scheme is required. This
serves two purposes. The first is to satisfy oneself, at least superficially the scheme in
question is actually a valid scheme and not some "trojan horse" that is being offered as a
valid encryption method. Secondly the review should ensure that no global variables or
other "kernel unfriendly" programming practices are evident. During the implementations

described above a commonly available version of FEAL was rejected after the initial review
and LOKI91 was adjusted to deal with the presence of some static data. The implementation
of Sapphire, which was originally translated from Object Oriented Pascal [15], was written
so that no static data was needed.
Having reviewed the source code, an object file should be created along with an appropriate
header file (.h) providing the required global prototype declarations.
The changes required within the Linux code can then largely be confined to tcp_encrypt.h,
tcp_encrypt.c, tcp.c within the linux/net/inet directory and a few Makefiles.
6.4.2. tcp_crypt.h

This header file provides the definitions and structures required by the rest of the kernel to
implement the prototype encryption schemes as defined in the crypt_register structure.
Each encryption scheme has a scheme number defined and for each scheme an additional
#define is required. These names serve as a symbol for the position in the crypt_register
structure of the new scheme. When adding a new scheme the MAX_CRYPT_PROTOCOL
constant also needs to be updated to reflect the new schemes appearance. Finally any new
structures required for the new scheme need to be added to the crypt_proto structure. This
will then flow through to the definition of a socket that will carry the new definitions at run
time.
6.4.3. tcpjorypt.c

This file contains the routines that transform call and parameters from the canonical format
used within tcp.c to the specific calls and parameters used by individual schemes.
When adding a new scheme, two new routines are mandatory. These are the encryptor and
the decryptor. Pointers to these routines are inserted into the crypt_register array at an offset
consistent with the symbolic names in crypt_register.
The format of the prototype parameter in these routines must conform to the existing
routines in the crypt jregister. i.e.

void encryptor{stnict crypt_proto *pcp, unsigned char *p, int len);
and
void decryptor[stnic± crypt_proto *pcp, unsigned char *p, int len);
In general these routines will consist of two parts. The first part will be the initialisation of
the crypt scheme (if required) and the second part will deal with the byte to byte encryption
or decryption of user data. These routines are free to make calls on the underlying
subroutines implementing the scheme in question.
6.4.4. MakefUes
The location and dependencies of any new source code files needs to be placed in one or
more of the kernel's Makefiles. With this done the kernel can now be regenerated in the
standard way.

7. Results
To gauge the overhead of adding secure TCP services to the Linux kernel a series of tests
were run with measurements taken to evaluate the overhead.
It should be noted at the outset that the results provided below do not represent a
comparison between the schemes presented. None of the encryption schemes was optimised
in any way for the hardware involved. In particular all routines were portable C language
implementations with no assembly language or other low level support.
The tests consisted of three programs and one well known application.
The three programs were: a client, a server and a control program. These were run to provide
explicit timings reported below.
The client and server program are similar to those described in Section 4.2 with the exception
that a variable (parameter driven) amount of data could be generated and an arbitrary host
could be specified by the client to allow the server to run on a remote machine.
The control program simply provided a user interface to the SIOCSMLSUA ioctl call
allowing various parameters to be set in the kernel.
The tests consisted of using the control program (called siocstnlsua) to set up the required
encryption scheme, then invoking the server in background with a specified amount of data
to deliver. The client would then be invoked and would read data until an end of file
condition was reached. The client then reports on the frequency distribution of binary data
recieved.
The server program typically would send one kilobyte blocks of ASCII character "A". The
client should then produce a frequency distribution consisting of 100% 'A"'s.
Both local only operations, where the client and server run on the same machine and host to
host remote operation were tested. The local host was used to test the validity of the
client/server programs as well as eliminate the possible effects of network transmission
bottlenecks. The disadvantage of the local host test was that the client/server programs were

competing against each other for CPU cycles in all cases.
The host to host tests were run between two similarly configured computers over a
10Mb/sec ethemet connection. At the time of the test these two machines were isolated on a
single ethemet segment with no other devices or traffic present. No other applications of
significance were running when these tests were in progress.
The application test involved using the control program to set up host to host encryption
schemes and then using the ftp(l) program to transfer relatively modest amounts of data
between hosts.
7.1. Observations
As would be expected for such simple applications, the majority of CPU time when running
these tests was spent in the Linux kernel. In the local host case all CPU cycles were
consumed on all tests, with little or no idle time. The more complex encryption schemes cost
more to run and the subroutine linkage overhead was minimal.
On the host to host tests it was observed that both client consumed about 70% of available
CPU cycles on most tests and network bandwidth was not as much of an issue as simple
network latency. The server on the other hand used only 30% of CPU cycles when no real
encryption scheme was active. This quickly rose to 100% of CPU cycles when serious
encryption was utilised. This reinforces the conclusion that CPU cycles, not network
bandwidth, was the limiting performance factor in these tests. The actual split of
applications across two machines in this distributed fashion accounts for the reduced
elapsed time in all tests when comparing local and remote execution.
The poor performance of LOKl was a surprise. However the version of DES used did
generate an optimised key schedule that was saved between successive calls.
When using the ftp program to a remote host transfer speeds of around 600KB/ sec were
observed when no encryption scheme was in use. The rate dropped to around 30KB/sec
when the most expensive schemes were employed.

The table below shows various times for client server program execution for a reasonable
data transfer for both locally and remotely run program for all implemented schemes.

Transmission
Sec.
Protocol
NULL
NOP
NON
DESCFB
DESECB
LOKI
DES3ECB
DES3CFB
SAPPHIRE

Sending 5 Mbyte of encrypted data
Local Host
Over Ethernet
Elapsed
CPU
Elapsed
CPU
Server
Client
Server
Client
Server
Client
Server
Client
20
20
15
4
8
8
3
7
30
31
15
4
10
10
4
7
39
38
7
20
18
18
8
8
341
340
169
159
164
163
163
120
87
86
32
43
38
37
36
26
3677
3676
1837
1825
1833
1832
1829
1367
169
168
84
74
78
78
77
55
150
148
76
66
69
68
47
68
97
95
47
34
42
42
41
28

8. Conclusion
An extension to the implementation of TCP under Linux has been described. This extension
allows program controlled and kernel controlled invocation of encryption schemes between
cooperating socket based programs. The architecture of TCP has remained intact, with
additional option fields within TCP headers being used to pass encryption setup information
between TCPs. The implementation of TCP has been modified by the addition of ioctl
commands to achieve the necessary setup and control of encryption schemes. Performance
measures showed a significant overhead can be associated with certain encryption methods.
8.1. Future work

The use of specific encryption hardware to speed up the encryption process may go some
way to alleviating the overhead of encryption. Additional work is required to automate the
secure delivery of master keys by incorporating some existing system (i.e. Kerberos) into
control programs such as siocsmlsua.
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Appendix #1 - The Sapphire Cipher

sapphire.h

#ifndef SAPPHIRE
^define SAPPHIRE
struct sapphire {
u n s i g n e d char

rotor,ratchet,avalanche,last_plain,last_cipher,cards[256];

};
extern
extern
extern
extern
#endif

s a p p h i r e _ i n i t ( u n s i g n e d char * u s e r _ k e y , s t r u c t sapphire *s);
u n s i g n e d char s a p p h i r e _ e n c r y p t ( u n s i g n e d char b , s t r u c t s a p p h i r e *s);
u n s i g n e d char s a p p h i r e _ d e c r y p t ( u n s i g n e d char b , s t r u c t s a p p h i r e *s);
v o i d s a p p h i r e _ d u m p ( s t r u c t sapphire *s);

sapphire.c

#include "sapphire.h"
sapphire_init(unsigned char *user_key,struct sapphire *s)
{
int keypos;
unsigned int to_swap,swap_temp,rsum,i,j;
s->rotor = 1;
s->ratchet = 3;
s->avalanche = 5;
s->last_plain = 7;
s->last_cipher = 9;
for ( i = 0 ; i < 256 ; i++ )
s->cards[i] = i;
keypos = 1;
to_swap = 0;
rsiim = 0;
for ( i = 255 ; i <= 0 ; i — ) {
{
unsigned int u,v,mask;
V = 0;

mask = 1;
while ( mask < i )
mask = (mask << 1) + 1;
do {
rsum = s->cards[rsum] + user_key[keypos];
keypos++;
if ( keypos > user_key[0] ) {
keypos = 0;
rsum = rsum + user_key[0];

}
u = mask & rsum;
V++;
if ( V > 11 )

u = u % i;
} while ( u <= i );
to_swap = u;

}
swap_temp = s->cards[i];
s->cards[i] = s->cards[to_swap];
s->cards[to_swap] = swap_temp;

}

unsigned char sapphire_encrypt(unsigned
{
unsigned char

char b,struct sapphire

*s)

swaptemp;

sapphire_dump(s);

}

s->ratchet = (s->ratchet + s->cards[s->rotor]) & OxOff;
s->rotor = ( s->rotor + 1 ) & OxOff;
swaptemp = s->cards[s->last_cipher];
s->cards[s->last_cipher] = s->cards[s->ratchet];
s->cards[s->ratchet] = s->cards[s->last_plain];
s->cards[s->last_plain] = s->cards[s->rotor];
s->cards[s->rotor] = swaptemp;
s->avalanche = ( s->avalanche + s->cards[swaptemp] ) & OxOff;
s->last_cipher = b " s->cards[s->cards[
(s->cards[s->ratchet]+
s->cards[s->rotor]+
s->cards[s->last_plain]+
s->cards[s->last_cipher]+
s->cards[s->avalanche]) & OxOff
]] ;
s - > l a s t _ p l a i n = b;
sapphire_dump(s);
return(s->last_cipher);

unsigned char sapphire_decrypt(unsigned
{
unsigned char

char b,struct sapphire

*s)

swaptemp;

sapphire_dump(s);
s->ratchet = (s->ratchet + s->cards[s->rotor]) & OxOff;
s->rotor = ( s->rotor + 1 ) & OxOff;
swaptemp = s->cards[s->last_cipher];
s->cards[s->last_cipher] = s->cards[s->ratchet];
s->cards[s->ratchet] = s->cards[s->last_plain];
s->cards[s->last_plain] = s->cards[s->rotor];
s->cards[s->rotor] = swaptemp;
s->avalanche = ( s->avalanche + s->cards[swaptemp] ) & OxOff;
s->last_plain = b " s->cards[s->cards[
(s->cards[s->ratchet]+
s->cards[s->rotor]+
s->cards[s->last_plain]+
s->cards[s->last_cipher]+
s->cards[s->avalanche]) & OxOff
]] ;
s - > l a s t _ c i p h e r = b;
sapphire_dump(s);
return(s->last plain);

void sapphire_dump(struct sapphire *s)
{
#ifdef SAPPHIRE_DUMP
register int i,j;
printf("Dump of sapphire bufferO);
printf("rotor - %d",s->rotor) ;
printf("ratchet - %d",s->ratchet) ;
printf("avalanche - %dO,s->avalanche);
printf("last_plain - %d",s->last_plain);
printf("last_cipher - %dO,s->last_cipher);
for ( i = 0 ; i < 32 ; i++ ) {
for ( j = 0 ; j < 8 ; j ++ )
printf("%d",s->cards[i*8+j]);
printf("0);

}
#endif
}

Appendix #2 - A Server Program using User supplied keys

^include <stdio.h>
^include <SYs/types.h>
^include oys/socket .h>
^include <sys/ioctl.h>
^include <netinet/in.h>
^include <netdb.h>
^include "c-s.h"
main(argc,argv)
int argc;
char *argv[];
{
int sock,wsock,len;
struct sockaddr_in sin,fsin;
unsigned char pch[] = "Hello World";
unsigned long key[2],iv[2];
sock = socket(AF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,0);
if ( sock == -1 ) {
fprintf(stderr,"Socket returned -10);
exit(-1) ;

}
bzero((char *)&sin,sizeof(sin));
sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
sin.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
sin.sin_port = htons(MYPORT);
key[0] = 58;
key[1] = 37;
iv[0] = 1;
iv[13 = 2;
if ( ioctKsock, SIOCSOCRYPTP ,3) != 0 ) {
fprintf(stderr,"SIOCSCRYPTP - Not supportedO);
exit (-1) ;

}
if ( ioctKsock, SIOCSOCKEY ,key) != 0 ) {
fprintf(stderr,"SIOCSCOKEY - Not supportedO);
exit(-1);

}
if ( ioctKsock, SIOCSOCIV , iv) != 0 ) {
fprintf(stderr,"SIOCSCOIV - Not supportedO);
exit (-1) ;

}
if (bind(sock,(struct sockaddr *)&sin,sizeof(sin)) == -1 ) {
fprintf(stderr,"bind returned an errorO);
exit(-1);

}
if ( listen(sock,5) < 0 ) {
fprintf(stderr,"listen could not listen?0);

exit(-l);
}
wsock = accept(sock,(struct sockaddr *) &fsin,&len);
if ( wsock < 0 ) {
fprintf(stderr,"Accept failedO);
exit(-l);
}
write(wsock,pch,strlen(pch) ) ;
close(wsock);
close(sock);
exit(O);

